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U.S. AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES 
TO IMPROVING AIRSPACE CONGESTION
by
Richard L. Clarke, Clemson University, South Carolina 
and
Clinton hi. Whitehurst, Jr., Strom Thurmond Institute, 
South Carolina
April 25, 1991 
Revised October 15, 1991
It is evident to anyone who has recently travelled by a 
commercial airline in the United States or Europe that some­
thing needs to be done and done fast to relieve the ground and 
air congestion that exists at major air hubs. The February 1st, 
1991 runway collision at Los Angeles International Airport in 
which 34 people were killed is the most recent, tragic example 
of what can happen when the infrastructure of a national 
aviation system becomes inadequate to meet the demands 
placed upon it.
As the number of saturated airports in Europe and the 
United States increases, federal aviation authorities on both 
continents are studying a number of ways to relieve airspace 
and airport congestion. The purpose of this paper is to identify 
and analyze the major options being considered. While all 
options will be examined, most attention will be focused on the 
airspace around airports and the air traffic control (ATC) system 
that regulates this airspace. Of all the components of an air 
transport system, airspace around an airport is the one that is 
absolutely constrained. It can be expanded by definition, but it 
cannot be expanded as a practical matter once defined.1 The
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four major approaches to airspace congestion reviewed in this 
paper are (1) new/larger airports, (2) greater use of surface 
transport alternatives, (3) rationing airspace and runways and 
(4) improved air and ground traffic control systems.
New/Larger Airports
This option to improve the air travel system is the most 
easily understood, yet is the most expensive in terms of 
construction costs, land acquisition, and environmental costs 
imposed on the surrounding area e.g., more traffic congestion 
and noise. Of the three costs, the environmental one generally 
receives the most publicity.
There are some major advantages and disadvantages of a 
new airport versus expansion of an existing one. One major 
advantage of building a new airport is that the airport design can 
be state of the art and built to allow expansion. A new airport 
can be located to maximize the air (control) space around the 
metropolitan area it serves and it can be located to maximize 
ground access to the airport. New airport negatives are (1) 
greater construction costs, (2) more contentious with respect to 
environmental impact, and (3) difficulty in making inter carrier 
connections. From an operational point of view, the third 
disadvantage evokes the most concern. It is the main reason all­
cargo carriers are against all-cargo airports. In this respect it is 
argued:
• Such airports would be theoretically built away 
from the major cities where land is available 
for expansion. They could also be established at 
former military airports that are available for 
purchase from the federal government.
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• The advantages of regular airports, such as 
proximity to population centers, and availability 
of connecting flights, far out weigh the benefits 
of more space and less congestion at an
all-cargo airport.
• Most important, the vast majority of general cargo 
is carried in the bellies of passenger aircraft, not 
in freighters. No air carrier would be willing to 
divert a plane with passengers to an all-cargo airport 
to unload cargo.2
For the same reason, regional carriers, i.e., commuter 
airlines, resist the idea of being moved to so-called reliever 
airports. The concern of the commuter airlines has lessened, 
however, as the hub and spoke system has continued to 
develop, a system which depends upon small commuter 
planes feeding traffic into large hub airports.
Of the 40 largest metropolitan areas in Europe and the 
United States, 16 have two or more airports. None have an all 
freight airport although such was being considered for Frank­
furt (Germany), Examples of two airport cities are Washington, 
DC, New York, (three including Newark), Chicago, San Fran­
cisco/Oakland, London, and Paris.
Airport expansion also has its problems. First, expansions 
create essentially the same problems with respect to inter­
airline connections as do two airports serving the same metro­
politan that are geographically separated. When a light rail 
system must be used to connect terminals within an airport 
(Dallas-Ft. Worth, Houston, Texas), an airport is probably very 
close to it optimum size. Nonetheless, even an expanded 
airport causes fewer connection problems than two geographi­
cally separate airports. Airports in the United States and Europe 
that have undergone major expansions include JFK Interna­
tional (NYC), Chicago's O'Hare, Los Angeles International, 
Baltimore-Washington International, Logan International (Bos­
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ton), Zurich (Switzerland) and Heathrow (London). Examples 
of new, state-of-the-art airports in the United States are 
Atlanta,Georgia's Hartsfield International Airport and Denver, 
Colorado's Stapleton International Airport.
Alternate Surface Transport Systems
Surface transport systems are here defined to include 
highway (automobile, bus, truck), rail, passenger and freight, 
and to a lesser extent, rivers and oceans (barges, ocean carriers, 
ferries, and passenger ships). Over the past 20 years the option 
most discussed to improve overall transport efficiency has been 
to substitute high speed rail passenger transportation for the 
privately-operated automobile. The arguments for this substitu­
tion that are most cited include relieving highway congestion, 
lessening pollution caused by automobiles, and fuel conserva­
tion. As a practical matter the option has found more favor in 
Europe than in North American. France'sTrain a Grande Vitesse 
(TGV) began service between Paris and Lyon in 1983. It is the 
best known of the European high speed rail services. The TGV 
train travels at an average speed of 1 32 mph and covers the 244- 
rails miles from Paris to Lyon in two hours flat.3 It might also be 
noted that the train has paid all of its operating and construction 
costs from fares.
French planstoexpand itsTGV system can be summarized 
thus:
• Europe's railroads have cooperated for years 
in running international services, but the TGV 
prompted officials to take another step. They 
began to look at numerous routes between major 
cities where trains averaging in excess of 100 
mph could be truly competitive with airlines.
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* In France, plans are under way to expand the 
TCV network beyond Brittany and southeast 
France to include Brussels, Belgium, Amsterdam, 
the Netherlands; the French cities of Bordeaux 
and Strasbourg; and cities in West Germany 
and Switzerland.
* "In 1992, the railroads will find themselves
in a different environment," said Dagobert M.
Scher, vice president for French Rail, Inc. the 
North American marketing arm of the French 
National Railroad.
* 'The goal is to tie together cities 200 to 500 miles 
apart at rail speeds fast enough to make the service 
truly competitive with airlines." 4
Other planned high speed European rail systems include 
Milan, Italy to Rome; London via the Channel Tunnel to Paris, 
Brussels, Amsterdam, and Cologne; London to Folkestone, 
Glasgow and Bristol; and all major German cities to Europe. 
Projects to improve rail service are also in the planning stage in 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Austria.
In the United States and Canada it was the improved 
highway system that ended scheduled air service between cities 
less than 100 miles apart. And as planes became larger and 
faster direct air service between cities up to 1 50 miles apart 
decreased. The major exception to this trend was flights from 
cities 100-200 miles from major hub airports.
However, the possibility of United States high speed rail 
systems that would be competitive with airlines is an idea that 
will not go away. At different times proposals have been made 
for high speed rail service between San Diego and Los Angeles, 
Chicago and Milwaukee, Chicago and Minneapolis/St. Paul and 
upgrading the represent 85-90 mph Amtrak routes in the so- 
called Northeast Corridor, that is, Boston to New York, and
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New York to Washington, DC. The latest proposal is for a high 
speed magnetic train (magnetic levitation or meglev) to service 
the 265 mile route from Los Angles to Las Vegas. The train 
would operate at speeds up to 300 miles per hour and cover the 
distance in 75 minutes.5
Although the United States has lagged Europe in upgrading 
its rail passenger service, its rail freight service has improved to 
a point where dedicated container trains, trailer on flat car 
(TOFC), and roadrailers, successfully compete with trucks on 
many high density traffic corridors.
As the case of short distance airline service, an improved 
highway system which incorporated bridges and tunnels, all but 
ended ferry services in the United States. In Europe, however, 
ferries are still competitive in linking English Channel and North 
Sea ports. Hovercraft operate profitably between England and 
France. And in the United States, surface effect ship technology 
has attracted some renewed interest and investment. In New 
York City, for example, ferries have made a comeback as one 
means of avoiding highway congestion.
• While boats once were the only way into and 
out of Manhattan, ferry travel largely fell into 
disfavor after 1930 with the construction of New 
York's network of bridges, tunnels and highways.
• But in the past four years, seven private ferry 
operators have established 1 3 routes into 
Manhattan. The routes range from short hauls 
from new housing developments on the New 
Jersey side of the Hudson River to 45 minute 
runs from Monmouth County New Jersey, 
across Raritan Bay.
• The private ferries carry about 10,000 riders a day 
into and out of Manhattan.
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• To city officials, the Metro Manhattan represents 
a technological advancement in ferry service that 
could make longer-distance commutes more 
feasible.
• The 110 foot vessel is what is known as a surface 
effect ship, a hybrid between a catamaran and
a hovercraft. It rides on a cushion of air that lifts 
85% of the boats weight out of the water. The 
limited contact with the water allows a vessel 
to achieve speeds as high as 48.6 knots-about 
56 mph.6
Whether rail, highway, or short haul ferries, surface trans­
portation options have received increased attention as an 
alternative to short and medium distance air service. To the 
extent that surface transportation can be competitive in terms 
of price and time with air, then to that extent congestion in 
European and North American air transport systems will be 
lessened.7
Table I contrasts airline distances, highway distances, and 
drivingtimes between major United States cities, of which many 
are major air hubs. Table II shows airline distances and esti­
mated high speed rail times between major European cities. An 
inspection of Table I indicates the extent to which highways are 
competitors to corresponding air services in the United States. 
Table II indicates the potential for European high speed rail 
service as a competitor to air transportation. And it takes no 
great amount of introspection to see the real possibility of 
United States high speed rail service, in time, becoming a 
significant competitor of airlines, especially over relatively short 
(200-500 mile) distances.
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Table I
Airline/Highway Distances and Driving Times 









New York-Buffalo 292 436 9 hrs.
Cleveland 405 514 10 hrs. 1 5 min.
Detroit 482 671 13 hrs. 55 min.
Pittsburgh 317 386 8 hrs. 45 min.
Boston 188 213 4 hrs. 35 min. 1 hr. 30 min
Washington DC 205 229 5 hrs. 30 min. 1 hr. 50 min
Philadelphia 83 93 2 hrs. 25 min.
Chicago-Cleveland 308 344 7 hrs. 10 min.
Omaha 432 493 9 hrs. 30 min.
Minneapolis 355 411 9 hrs.
Detroit 238 279 6 hrs. 05 min. 2 hrs.
Indianapolis 165 189 3 hrs. 50 min. 1 hr. 30 min
Kansas City 414 503 11 hrs. 50 min.
Louisville 296 305 6 hrs. 1 5 min.
Pittsburgh 410 457 1 0 hrs. 15 min.
Milwaukee 75 87 1 hr. 55 min.
Kansas City-Omaha 166 198 4 hrs. 15 min.
St. Louis 238 257 5 hrs. 25 min.
Dallas-Houston 225 242 5 hrs. 1 0 min. 1 hr. 55 min
Memphis 420 470 9 hrs. 45 min.
New Orleans 443 504 1 0 hrs. 55 min.
Los Angles-
San Francisco 347 403 9 hrs. 35 min.
San Diego 102 127 2 hrs. 50 min. 45 min.
Phoenix 357 398 9 hrs. 05 min.
Los Vegas 229 272 5 hrs. 50 min
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Table I continued
Airline/Highway Distances and Driving Times 
between Major U.S. Cities
City Pairs Air Road Driving Est. TCV
Distance Distance Time Time
Atlanta-New Orleans 412 480 11 hrs. 1 5 min
Jacksonville 280 313 7 hrs. 25 min.
Charlotte 220 240 5 hrs. 20 min.
Memphis 320 382 8 hrs. 55 min.
Birmingham 135 150 3 hrs. 20 min.
Chattanooga 90 113 2 hrs. 35 min.
Sources: National Geodetic Survey as published in Reader's Digest 
These United States. (Reader's Digest Association, Pleasantville, New 
York, 1968) p. 1 70and Rand McNally 1986 Road Atlas (Rand McNally 
& Co., Chicago, IL, 1986) p.2.
Range of highway speeds, 45-52 mph.
TCV estimated times based on Paris-Lyon TCV of 2 hours over similar 
terrain.
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Table II
Airline Distances and Estimated TCV Rail Times 
between Major European Cities'


















'Sources: Colliers World Atlas Gazette, (P.F. Collier & Son, New York, 
1957), p. 144 and Encyclopedia Britannica as published in the 1990 
Information Please Almanac (Houghton Mifflin, Boston MA, 1990). pp. 
330-31.
bCalculated on basis of Paris-Lyon TGV time. The 245 mile run takes 
a flat two hours at an average speed of 1 32 mph (Trains, V. 49 (April 
1989) p. 53. Calculated as a ratio of V240 x X/airline miles. Example: 
Berlin is 545 miles from Paris. TGV time = 2/240 x X/545 = 4.5 hours, 
30 minutes. No allowance made for differences in topography.
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Rationing Air Space and Runways
Another option to improve air travel systems is to make 
more efficient use of existing air space and airport runways. 
Technically, runways are a physical part of the airport, and like 
terminals, can only be added to subject to the constraints of land 
availability, construction costs, and environmental concerns. 
Here, however, runways are considered together with local 
airspace, primarily because both are subject to air traffic control 
procedures that can be improved by investment in state of the 
art air and ground control electronic systems. This option is 
discussed in the next section.
There are several ways in which local airspace and runway 
congestion can be lessened without increased investment in air 
traffic and ground control equipment. One is to limit airport use 
to large, commercial passenger aircraft. In practice, all cargo 
aircraft, private and business aircraft, and commuter aircraft 
would use secondary (reliever) airports located in the general 
metropolitan area. Necessary inter-airline connections would 
be handled by ground transport systems linking the airports. 
Objections to this option have already been noted.
All-cargo carriers stress that dedicated freight airports are 
impractical because of the need to interline with commercial 
passenger plane—which carry a significant part of the air freight 
movement in their cargo bellies. Commuter airlines stress the 
fact that their "reason for being" is to feed traffic into large 
airports and in this they are supported by most major passenger 
carriers. Corporate and private aircraft make the same argu­
ment but are not as persuasive given the private, rather than 
public, nature of their operations. However, both represent 
potent political constituencies and have been quite successful in 
maintaining their accessibility to large airports in the United 
States.
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A second alternative is to make better use of existing air and 
runway capacity. Basically, it is to "encourage" round the clock 
use of the airport, or at least to extend the peak use periods . 
One way is to recognize that a landing or takeoff time (a slot) is 
a valuable economic asset and as such should not be treated as 
a free good.
In 1969 the FAA implemented a high density rule at five 
major airports - Newark, La Guardia, O'Hare, Washington 
National, and JFK International. (Newark was later dropped 
from the list) The rule set a ceiling on the total number of slots 
available during each hour of the day...a so-called slot control 
system. The allocation of the slots was by a committee made up 
of carriers using the airport with the FAA in an oversight role. A 
chief criticism of the slot control system was that existing airlines 
at the four airports could keep competitors out through their 
control over an FAA fixed number of slots.
Following the air controllers strike in 1985, the committee 
system for allocating slots at the four airports allegedly broke 
down, i.e., the airlines could not agree among themselves. 
Allocation by committee was replaced with a lottery system 
administered by the FAA. In 1986 the lottery system was 
replaced by an open market system under which carriers were 
allowed to buy, sell, and lease their slots. Existing carrier slots 
were "grandfathered" to the then user of the slots. Essentially, 
the system of slot control was replaced by a slot market. David 
Graham of the Institute of Defense Analysis notes that some 
slots have sold for more than $700,000.®
Another suggested approach to rationing air and runway 
space is for congested airports to establish market-clearing 
prices for take off and landing rights. In this case, higher prices 
would be charged during peak periods, and less during off peak 
periods. The argument here is that slot markets are difficult to 
operate and that a market-clearing price system would accom­
plish the same objective.
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At airports, other than the four hubs cited above, takeoff 
and landing rights are handled by committees made up of 
existing carriers. In no United States airport are takeoff and 
landing fees used to allocate airport capacity. In most cases the 
fees are minimal, due, in part, to competition among airports.
The use of slot markets has not gone unchallenged. Some 
carriers urge that sale of slots to the highest bidder unfairly favors 
large carriers with deep pockets, while discouraging efforts by 
the federal and local governments to expand the number of 
airports and existing airport capacity. On the other hand, a 
number of carriers and some officials within the FAA are in favor 
of establishing slot controls at other high density airports. The 
counter-argument is that whether the slots are allocated by 
lottery or a market price, the present committee system would 
unduly favor existing carriers and inhibit competition, i.e. new 
carriers coming into the airport.
Improved Air Traffic Control and Ground Control
Airport capacity limitations are plaguing airlines and air 
travelers at a growing number of the world's major airports. The 
cost of delays and passenger inconvenience is in the millions 
annually. The impact of airport congestion hit hard in the 
United States in the early 1980's. The United States Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) formally recognized airspace 
capacity problems in 1982 and in 1983 announced a $25 
billion, 20 year-plan called the National Airspace System (NAS) 
Plan to reduce airspace congestion by the year 2000. The plan 
focuses on increasing airspace capacity by (1) the safe reduction 
of separation standards, horizontally and vertically, (2) real­
time management of aircraft flow, and (3) increased productiv­
ity of the air traffic control (ATC) system. The plan does depend 
on building new airports or adding new runways at existing 
airports. In fact, only one new major United States airport 
(Dallas-Ft. Worth, 1973) has been built in the past 20 years and 
only one is planned for the 1990s (Denver 1995).
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In 1981 the FAA created an Aviation Industry Task Force to 
conduct in depth research on what needed to be done, what 
could be done, what would work and what would not work, 
and how much proposed solutions would cost. The result was 
a comprehensive NAS plan that consists of 92 separate projects, 
including 1 2 major systems acquisitions costing over $1 50 
million each.9
Major technical efforts included in the NAS Plan include 
the following:
1. closely-space parallel runway independent IFR 
operations
2. reduction of IFR minimums on converging runways
3. reduction of longitudinal separation
4. exploitation of curved segmented approaches
5. advanced terminal area automation
6. application of cockpit traffic displays for pilots
7. application of computer modeling techniques for 
traffic flow
8. reduction of wake-vortex impacts
9. development and implementation of microwave 
landing system
10. development of improved airport surface surveillance 
system.10
When all phases of the NAS Plan are complete, airspace 
capacity around a number of major U.S. hubs will be signifi­
cantly increased. Expected capacity increases vary by airport, 
aircraft type and other factors, but the FAA estimates, in general, 
that changes in ATC Procedures supported by new technologies 
can increase the capacity of existing airports by an average of 
25- 30%. Detailed capacity increases suggested by the FAATask 
Force are summarized in Table III. Of the actions listed in Table 
III, implementation of a new landing system, the microwave 
landing system or MLS, appears to offer the greatest potential 
for increasing airspace capacity. Problems addressed by MLS 
include more efficient management of existing airspace and
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approach paths, as well as improving precision approaches in 
bad weather. The microwave landing system can provide 
increased airspace capacity because it is able to support curved 
and steeper angle approaches, multiple runways, and lower 
weather minimums.
Table III
Potential Airspace Capacity Increases
Action Percentage Increase 
in Capacity
1 . New runways or changed ATC 
procedures to allow new 
independent arrival streams 40-100%
2. Reduced separation standards 15-20%
3. Reduced system variabilities 1 0-1 5%
4. Average expected gain 25-30%
Source: FAA Task Force (see note 10)
Figure 1 shows schematically how MLS differs from the 
existing instrument landing system (ILS). The curved and seg­
mented MLS approach capabilities enable air traffic controllers 
to minimize airspace conflicts, get more aircraft safely in the 
landing pattern, and reduce time in local airspace. The system 
accomplished these objectives thorough the use of "an electri­
cally scanning radar capable of updating aircraft targets as often 
as two times a second as compared to once every five seconds 
for conventional airport surveillance radar."11
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Instrument Landing System (ILS)
Microwave Landing System (MLS)
Figure 1. Instrument Landing System contrasted with Micro- 
wave Landing System. The ILS provides a precise but narrow 
approach path. The MLS provides a wider area of navigation 
coverage and multiple precision approach paths.
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The MLS technology has been developed and is currently 
undergoing extensive operational research and testing at two 
large United States airports (Memphis, Tennessee and Raleigh- 
Durham, North Carolina). Current FAA plans are to install MLS 
at the busiest United States airports. A major goal of this testing 
and research program is to show that aircraft can be controlled 
so accurately that bad weather landings can be made simulta­
neously on parallel runways spaced only 3000 feet apart. If the 
technology proves out, the FAA estimates bad-weather capacity 
can be increased by 25 percent at 1 2 major affected United 
States airports reducing delays by up to 250,000 aircraft hours 
in the year 2000.12
Another part of the United States plan to reduce airspace 
congestion is the Advanced Automation System (AAS). The 
AAS, at an estimated cost of $5 billion, is the most expansive 
single project in the NAS Plan.13 The AAS includes the 
replacement of most current ATC computer hardware, soft­
ware and controller work stations at airport tower, terminal area 
and enroute facilities. It also includes new software designed to 
precisely predict en route aircraft positions, identify potential 
conflicts and generate alternative solutions for controllers to 
resolve potential conflicts. The FAA hopes this project, led by 
the IBM Corporation, will (1) increase ATC system availability, 
(2) save fuel and flight time and (3) reduce FAA operating costs. 
By automating the process of getting clearance for altitude or 
route changes the AAS will reduce controller's clerical workload 
giving them more time to focus on keeping aircraft safely 
separated.
Another major United States program aimed at increasing 
flight safety, particularly in the airspace over busy United States 
air hubs, is a sophisticated aircraft collision avoidance system. 
By the year 2000 the FAA will require all airliners be equipped 
with a Traffic and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Each 
airliner will be equipped with a receiver, radio beacon and a 
computer. If two TCAS-equipped aircraft are on a collision 
course, the detector in each aircraft will activate a warningsignal
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in each cockpit. The computer will determine a course of 
evasive action and will automatically steer the aircraft away 
from danger or advise the pilot what to do. To reduce the 
danger of a small, private aircraft flying visual-flight rules (VFR) 
colliding with an airliner, the FAA will require all small aircraft 
be equipped with a Mode C transponder.14 The Mode C 
transponder will broadcast an enhanced radar echo showing 
altitude on the controller's screen and at the same time activate 
the collision avoidance system onboard the commercial air­
liner.
Ground Radar
The overall NAS Plan also addresses the need for improved 
ground control at major air hubs by including an airport surface 
detection (called ASDE 3) project. The purpose of this project 
is to provide state-of-the-art monitoring of aircraft and ground 
support vehicle movement on all airport surfaces such as 
runways, taxiways and aircraft parking ares. The FAA plans to 
install this innovative downward-looking radar equipment at 30 
high-density U.S. airports by 1992.15 Ironically, Detroit is one 
of 30 planned implementation sites.
On December 3, 1990 two Northwest jets collided on 
Detroit's runway 3C killing nine people and injuring 21 others. 
The pilot of one of the aircraft apparently became confused in 
the dense fog and icy conditions which limited visibility to 800 
feet. He turned onto the active runway and taxied his aircraft 
directly into the path of a B-727 on takeoff roll. The tower 
controller could not see either aircraft. At present, at all United 
States airports, the tower controller must rely on pilots to 
accurately report their location on the airfield.16 Had the new 
airport surface radar been operational at Detroit on December 
3, 1990 this tragedy would probably not have occurred.
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In addition to the above air traffic control systems improve­
ments, the NAS Plan includes five other major programs. These 
are:
1. Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS)
2. Integrated Communications Switching System (ICSS)
3. Low Level Wind Shear Alert System (LLWAS)
4. Nondirectional Beacon (NDB)
5. Radio Communications Link (RCL)
The Automated Flight Service Station (AAFSS) is designed 
to improve flight planning by providing the latest weather, 
airspace, and general flying conditions information along the 
planned flight route. The FAA plans on implementing this 
system at 6l sites by 1995. The Integrated Communications 
Switching System (ICSS) is designed to enable controllers in air 
traffic control towers, terminal radar approach facilities and 
flight service stations to rapidly communicate with each other. 
The system will have basic intercom, interphone and radar 
capabilities. The ICSS is scheduled for installation at 221 sites by 
1993. A third project, the Low Level Wind Shear Alert System 
(LLWAS), is aimed at detecting and informing pilots and 
controllers of dangerous wind conditions at or near airports. 
This important system will alert controllers and pilots to wind 
shear conditions and direct aircraft out of danger. The LLWAS 
will be installed at 331 United States airports by 1993. The 
Nondirectional Beacon (NDB) is an enhanced navigational aid 
that pilots use to determine bearing from or to the station. This 
new system will also help improve the precision of instrument 
landing approaches. The specific number of required NNB sites 
is undetermined pending the completion of FAA air network 
studies. The last NAS project considered is the Radio Commu­
nications Link (RCL). The RCL is designed to serve as a general 
transmission network for data and voice among FAA facilities. 
This system when fully operational in the mid-nineties will tie 
together all air control facilities.17
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Summary and Recommendations
Congestion in air transportation systems is a major problem 
in Europe and in the United States. It is a problem that will likely 
get worse before it gets better. In the United States, decision 
makers, both in government and industry, have learned that 
there is no quick fix with respect to alleviating airport and 
airspace congestion. They have also learned that remedial 
programs take time-lots of time and lots of money. Also learned, 
often with hindsight, is that congestion problems are best 
handled when they first become visible, not when they have 
become so critical that safety is compromised. In Europe, the air 
system congestion problem is even more serious than in the 
United States. And with the liberalization of European aviation 
regulations after 1992, it will become worse.
This paper has reviewed four different major approaches to 
the air traffic congestion problems currently facing Europe and 
the United States. Of these four approaches, improving the air 
(and ground) traffic control systems by implementing state-of- 
the-art technologies appears to have the most merit. The cost is 
high and implementation difficult but this alternative is much 
cheaper and far more practical than building new airports or 
expanding existing ones in the world's major air hub cities. 
However, while U.S. and European aviation officials move to 
develop and implement improved air traffic control systems 
they should not overlook the power of rationing scarce re­
sources. In this respect, the use of local airspace and airport 
runways is basically an economic problem involving the alloca­
tion of a scarce resource, i.e. takeoff and landing slots at 
particular times during a 24-hour day. Managers learned long 
ago that a pricing system based on supply and demand is often 
a most efficient and equitable way of allocating scarce resources 
among competing users. Market clearing prices and the buying 
and selling of slots should not be rejected out of hand by 
aviation authorities as ways to reduce congestion. Spreading out 
air traffic more uniformly over an 1 8-24-hour day at major air 
hubs offers a number of benefits at a relatively low cost.
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One final observation, not a conclusion, is in order. Travel 
patterns in the industrially advanced countries in North America, 
Europe and the Pacific Rim will undergo major changes in the 
21 st century, if not before. While air will remain the preferred 
mode for long distance (over 500 miles) travel, present medium 
distance air routes will give way to high-speed rail. This is 
occurring rapidly in Europe and it is no longer a question of 
whether but when in the United States. And while the love affair 
between Americans and their private automobiles will slow the 
movement toward rail and other public transport systems, the 
movement will only be slowed - not stopped.
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CUSTOMER SATISFACTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
DISTRIBUTION: DO WATER PORTS KNOW 
WHAT SHIPPERS REALLY WANT?
by
Paul R. Murphy and James M. Daley, 
John Carroll University, 
and
Douglas R. Dalenberg, University of Montana
Introduction
International trade has grown substantially in the past two 
decades8, rising from 1 2.8% of U.S. GNP in 1970 to 23.3% in 
1988. Although the primary method of transportation for 
international shipments is water transportation5, international 
trade participants have seen tremendous growth in their trans­
portation choices over the past decade. As a result, some water 
ports have become more aggressive marketers; for example, the 
Port of Los Angeles has implemented a customer service center6 
to answer questions concerning port storage facilities and 
steamship service.
Given the competitive pressures that currently exist in 
international distribution, international water ports might con­
sider adopting a strategic marketing approach. According to 
Assael2, this approach focuses on determining and satisfying 
customer needs, while also maintaining advantages over com­
peting firms in terms of costs and product offerings. Failure to 
adopt this customer and competitor orientation could have 
important economic consequences for individual ports, as 
illustrated by recent experiences at the Port of Baltimore. 
Between 1985 and 1989, general cargo volumes at Baltimore 
declined by over one million short tons; Hampton Roads
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(Virginia), a major competitor, saw an increase of almost 2.5 
million tons over the same time period.3 According to experts3, 
a primary reason for Baltimore'sslippage has been uncompetitive 
labor practices relative to neighboring ports.
Water ports have historically considered ocean-going wa­
ter carriers to be their primary customers4, to the virtual 
exclusion of other customer groups. In fact, the authors are 
aware of a situation4 in which a consultant had been called in 
to help a U.S. port with its marketing efforts. The consultant 
listed a well-known U.S. freight railroad as one of the port's 
major customers; the Port Director disagreed, saying that the 
railroad was not a customer, but rather a railroad.
The ports' emphasis on water carriers is partially attribut­
able to the fact that without the water carriers, there would be 
no services for ports to provide; for instance, a lack of inbound 
carriers will strongly influence outbound operations. While 
water carriers are undeniably key port customers, this paper will 
argue that water ports can be viewed as "middlemen'' in 
international distribution (see Figure 1). Figure 1 shows that 
ports have actually several different groups of potential custom­
ers, including ocean carriers, accessorial carriers, shippers and 
other ports. Each of these groups has distinct needs and wants, 
and for ports to structure much of their operations to satisfy 
ocean carriers could cause discontent among other key cus­
tomer groups. Erik Stromberg, President and Chief Executive 
Officer of the American Association of Port Authorities has 
recognized that”:
Port managers and their governing boards have had 
to significantly rethink the port's role in maritime 
commerce. For example, no longer can efficient 
port operations be defined based on shipside cargo 
handling. It must encompass sea lanes to interior 
rail and highway linehaul routes. As a result, 
strategic planning and marketing have become 
the twin imperatives of successful port management.































This research will focus on the shipper-water port interface, 
and will demonstrate that many large U.S. industrial corpora­
tions feel that they play a strong role in 1) evaluating port 
features and 2) selecting the water ports used in international 
distribution. One part of this paper will compare shippers and 
water ports in terms of the factors used to evaluate international 
water ports. In addition, there will be shipper-port comparisons 
on operational and safety issues that can influence theefficiency 
of international water port operations. The use of information 
from both shippers and water ports is valuable because cus­
tomer assessments of a particular situation often differ from the 
seller's appraisal of the same situation9.
Methodology And Respondent Characteristics
The information in this paper is drawn from mail surveys 
sent to international water ports (hereafter referred to as ports) 
and U.S. industrial corporations (hereafter referred to as ship­
pers). For the ports, the surveys were targeted to the highest 
ranking employees having international trade responsibilities, 
while the shipper surveys were addressed to the highest ranking 
corporate logistics executive. A Container News directory of 
international transportation linksand nodes wasused to identify 
236 international water ports, from whom 86 usable responses 
were received, representing a response rate of 36.4%. (Re­
source constraints allowed for the survey to be printed only in 
English, which likely depressed the response rate.)
The 1989 Fortune 500 listingof U.S. industrial corporations 
served as the sampling frame for the shippers, with surveys 
being sent to the 400 highest ranking corporations. Of the 400 
surveys mailed, 1 7 were undeliverable, leaving an effective 
sample size of 383; 81 usable responses were received, for a 
21.2% response rate.
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The authors used a variety of sources in the development 
of the questionnaire items. Questions involving the respondent's 
roles in port evaluation and selection were drawn from the 
marketing literature, which suggests that there are several 
buying roles (e.g., influencer, purchaser) associated with pur­
chasing decisions.8
The list of port selection factors was derived from previous 
transportation choice research such as Burdg and Daley3 and 
Stock and LaLonde.12 Respondents were limited to only nine 
selection factors because consumers rarely use more than six 
evaluative criteria when making decisions.6 Respondents were 
also asked to evaluate selected international trade issues; while 
this listing is not comprehensive, it is representative, and was 
drawn from newspapers, trade publications and discussions 
with transportation and logistics managers.
Selected demographic characteristics of respondents and 
their organizations are presented in Table 1. Sixty percent of the 
port respondents were between 40 and 59 years of age, while 
a similar percentage had been with their employer for ten or 
more years. The responding ports have annual revenues ranging 
from under $10 million (U.S. dollars) per year to over $500 
million. Thirty percent of the ports handle at least 10,000,000 
short tons (i.e., 2,000 pounds = 1 ton) of freight per year. As for 
the shippers, approximately 65% of their respondents were 
between 40 and 59 years old, with 62% reporting ten or more 
years of company tenure. Not surprisingly, the shippers repre­
sent large organizations, with nearly two-thirds reporting annual 
revenues of between $1 billion and $4,999 billion. One-third 
of the shippers have annual shipment volumes of more than 
1,000,000 tons.
The information in Table 2 details several aspects of the 
shipper's participation in international trade. The median ton­
nage for international shipments was23,430 tons(low = 0, high 
= 200,000,000), with nearly 40% of the shippers indicating that 
international shipments account for at least 25% of their
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outbound tonnage. In addition, the median tonnage for inter­
national water shipments is 12,500 tons (low = 0, high = 
196,000,000), with an average of 62% of international ship­
ments moving by water.
Almost 75% of the international shipments involve the use 
of freight forwarders, which might be an indication that the 
shippers are not involved in port evaluation and selection. On 
the contrary, as shown in Table 2, the shippers indicated that 
they take a very active role in negotiating with, evaluating, and 
selecting the water ports used in international commerce. For 
example, nearly 75% of the shippers indicate a high degree of 
responsibility for 1) determining the necessary features of a 
water port as well as 2) selecting international water ports.
Results
1. Port Evaluation Factors. The previous section demon­
strated that the top logistics personnel at many large U.S. 
manufacturing companies feel that they play key roles in 
evaluating and selecting the water ports to be used in interna­
tional trade. In order to determine whether ports recognize the 
evaluation factors important to shippers, the information in 
Table 3 presents the results of t-tests of mean equality for port 
and shipper responses to nine port evaluation factors.3 The 
mean scores were based on port and shipper importance ratings 
for each attribute, using a five point scale where 1 = very 
unimportant and 5 = very important. In addition, each group's 
mean ratings were ranked from highest to lowest; port and 
shipper rankings were then compared using the Spearman test 
of rank correlation.
3Equality of variance results indicated that t-tests were a feasible 
technique.





Age % of Respondents
Under 30 3.6
30 - 39 23.0
40 - 49 24.0
50 - 59 37.4
Over 59 12.0
Respondent's Years with Present Organization
Years % of Respondents
0 - 4 23.8





Revenues (U.S. dollars) % of Companies
Under $10 million (M) 25.0
$10 M - $49.99 M 38.8
$50 M - $99.99 M 17.5
Over $99.99 M 18.7
Short Tons Handled
Tons (000s) % of Companies
Under 2,500 28.0
2,500 - 4,999 21.0
5,000 - 9,999 20.0
Over 9,999 32.0




Age % of Respondents
Under 30 2.5
30 - 39 21.3
40 - 49 38.7
50 - 59 26.3
Over 59 11.2
Respondent'si Years with Present Organization
Years % of Respondents
0 - 4 19.8





Revenues % of Companies
Under $1 billion (B) 11.4
$1 B - S4.999B 63.3
$5B - $9.999B 13.9
Over S9.999B 11.4
Annual Shipment Volumes
Tonnage % of Companies
0 - 99,999 45.9
100,000 - 999,999 19.7
1,000,000 - 9,999,999 14.4
Over 9,999,999 19.7
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Table 2
SHIPPER INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
International Shipments
Tonnage % of Respondents Median
0 5.3
1 - 999 15.8
1,000 - 9,999 21.0 23,430




As % of Total Tonnage % of Respondents Mean
0 - 24.9% 60.6
25 - 49.9% 24.2 24.9%
50 - 74.9% 6.1
Over 74.9% 9.1
International Water Shipments








As % of International Shipments % of Respondents Mean
0 - 24.9% 23.4
25 - 49.9% 11.7 61.1%
50 - 74.4% 10.4
Over 74.9% 54.5
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Table 2 Cont.
Use of International Freight Forwarders




















1 identify my firm's 
operational need for 
a water port 3.8% 7.7 9.0 55.1 24.4
1 play an important 
role in collecting 
information about the 
features of different 
water ports 3.8 16.5 12.7 51.9 15.2
1 do not play an impor­
tant role in determining 
features my firm would 
need from a water port 23.1 51.3 7.7 11.5 6.4
I play an important role 
in evaluating different 
water ports 5.1 8.9 8.9 59.5 17.7
I play an active role in 
negotiating the prices 
and terms for the water 
ports my firm uses 7.6 20.3 6.3 45.6 20.3
I do not have a major 
influence on the final 
selection of a water port 
for my firm's operations 29.4 44.9 7.7 11.5 6,4
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding error.
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The information in Table 3 shows that the mean ratings for 
the ports ranged from a low of 3.00 (neither important nor 
unimportant) on claims handling to 4.50 (very important) on 
equipment availability. The shipper range was slightly narrower, 
going from 3.16 (neither important nor unimportant) on odd­
sized freight to 4.38 (important) on both equipment availability 
and loss and damage performance. With respect to the t-tests, 
three of the nine port evaluation factors show statistically 
significant differences at the .05 level. The attribute with the 
largest difference is large volume shipments, with a mean rating 
of 4.05 for ports and 3.34 for shippers. The two other attributes 
with statistically significant differences in importance ratings are 
loading and unloading facilities for large and/or odd-sized 
freight (port mean = 3.59; shipper mean = 3.16) and assistance 
in claims handling (port mean = 3.00; shipper mean = 3.35).
The Spearman coefficient of rank correlation, .741 7 (sig­
nificant at the .05 level), suggests that there are similarities 
between the port and shipper rankings of the port evaluation 
factors. For example, there are minimal ranking differences 
between ports and shippers on equipment availability, loss and 
damage records, and pickup and delivery times.
The evaluation factor with the largest rating (.71) and 
ranking (four places) discrepancies between port and shipper 
participants is large volume shipments. This is an intriguing 
finding, in part because an important trend in contemporary 
international water transportation has been load centering, 
which involves concentrating large volume shipments at only 
one port in a geographic area. The shipper responses (mean = 
3.34) appear to suggest that the ports (mean = 4.05) are 
overemphasizing the need to handle large volume shipments.
Rather than focusing so heavily on large volume shipments, 
the results of this study (see Table 3) indicate that port manage­
ment might improve their offerings in the area of customer 
service. For example, the mean importance ratings for claims 
handling (ports = 3.00; shippers = 3.35% are significantly
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different at the .05 level, while there is a ranking difference of 
two places (ninth for ports; seventh for shippers). Moreover, the 
ranking discrepancy for shipment information is two and one- 
half places (seventh among ports; tied for fourth among ship­
pers).
2. International Trade Issues. Respondents were pre­
sented with statements on a number of contemporary trade 
issues that might influence the efficiency of international water 
port operations, and were asked to assess each statement using 
a five point scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly 
agree. As was the case in the previous section, port and shipper 
responses were analyzed by t-tests of mean equalityb, with the 
results appearing in Table 4. In addition, Table 4 provides 
information on whether the shippers consider the particular 
issue to be important. To facilitate the discussion, the issues 
have been divided into two groups, 1) operational and 2) safety 
and security.
Operational Issues. As shown in Table 4, port and shipper 
differences were statistically insignificant on three of the nine 
operational issues. Ports slightly agree (mean = 3.41) that graft/ 
personal inducements are a minor problem in port operations, 
while shippers are neutral (mean = 3.16) on this issue. Both 
groups of respondents are essentially neutral concerning the 
influence of documentation complexity on port operations 
(port mean = 3.01; shipper mean = 3.14), while both groups 
agree (port mean = 3.79; shipper mean = 3.71) that cargo 
handlers at water ports should be fluent in the primary language 
of the country in which they work. Interestingly, none of these 
three issues was considered to be important by a majority of 
respondents; in fact, only about 25% feel that graft/corruption 
and language fluency are important. In other words, there is 
general agreement between the ports and the shippers on issues 
that are unimportant to the shippers.
bEquality of variance results indicated that t-tests were feasible.








Has equipment available 4.50(1) 4.38 (1.5) .81
Provides a low frequency 
of cargo loss or damage 4.26 (2) 4.38 (1.5) - .72
Offers convenient pickup 
and delivery times 4.15 (3) 4.01 (3) .81
Allows for large volume 
shipments 4.05 (4) 3.34 (8) 4.12’
Offers flexibility in meeting 
special handling 
requirements 4.00 (5) 3.76 (6) 1.49
Has low freight handling 
charges 3.95 (6) 3.95 (4.5) .02
Provides information 
concerning shipments 3.67 (7) 3.95 (4.5) -1.62
Has loading and unloading 
facilities for large and/or 
odd-sized freight 3.59 (8) 3.16 (9) 2.15"
Offers assistance in claims 
handling 3.00 (9) 3.35 (7) -2.04"
Spearman coefficient of rank correlation = .741 7, significant at 
p = .05.
'1 - very unimportant; 5 - very important 
"significant at .05 level 
’significant at .01 level
Volume IV, Number I 37
Of the six operational issues exhibiting statistically signifi­
cant differences between port and shipper responses, the one 
with the largest difference involves the influence of labor 
regulations on port operations; labor regulations also emerged 
as the most important (83%) of the issues presented in Table 4. 
Port respondents neither agree nor disagree (mean = 2.95) that 
labor regulations are a minor problem in port operations, while 
shippers definitely disagree (mean = 2.09). The importance of 
labor regulations on efficient port operations is illustrated by the 
comments11 of a leading official at the U.S. Maritime Adminis­
tration, who identified relations between port management and 
port labor to be the major impediment to efficient port opera­
tions in the coming decade.
Both pickup (PU) and delivery (D) times at ports are 
international trade issues that are important to a majority of the 
shippers, who feel that PU and D times are too lengthy, while 
ports do not. For both issues, the mean differences between 
port and shipper responses exceed .50 (on a five point scale), 
a strong indication that there are problems with pickup and 
delivery at ports. Although some causes of these delays may not 
be directly controllable (e.g., drayage problems, infrastructure- 
related congestion) by port management, marketing theory 
teaches that uncontrollable variables/factors/elements are none­
theless key components of a company's marketing environ­
ment. As a result, port management should determine: 1) 
whether PU and D times are a problem at their particular 
facility, and 2) the sources of PU and D time delays so that 
corrective action can be pursued.
Another operational issue considered to be important by a 
majority of shippers (63%) is standardized container sizes. 
Interestingly, the port respondents (mean = 4.31) more strongly 
favor standardized container sizes than do their shipper coun- 
terparts(mean = 3.75),an indication that shippers may not fully 
appreciate the operational complexities associated with differ­
ent sized containers (e.g., increased transfers of freight, in­
creased handling times and costs, increased opportunities for
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Table 4
International Water Transportation Issues
Issue




Ports Shippers t-value (% yes)
Operational Issues:
Graft/personal inducements 
are a minor problem in
water port operations 3.41 3.16 1.54 26.6%
Complexity of documentation 
is the major problem in 
water port operations
Cargo handlers at water 
ports should be fluent 
in the primary language 
of the country in which 
they work
International cargo losses 
are higher at a water port 
than while in transit
Labor regulations are a minor 
problem in water port
operations 2.95 2.09 4.87’ 83.3%
Containers are more likely 
to be damaged while in 
transit than while at a
water port 3.31 2.94 2.29“ 43.8%
Carrier pickup at water ports
takes too much time 2.82 3.36 -3.64‘ 61.5%
3.01 3.14 -.78 45.5%
3.79 3.71 .58 23.9%
2.68 3.30 -4.25' 45.5%
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Table 4 cont.
International Water Transportation Issues
Issue




Ports Shippers t-value (% yes)
Operational Issues:
Carrier delivery at water ports
takes too much time 2.71 3.34 -4.14' 55.6%
Container sizes need to be 
standard worldwide 4.31 3.75 4.31' 62.7%
Safety and Security Issues:
Hazardous cargoes should 
not be moved in
international trade 1.80 1.91 -.97 58.5%
Packaging standards for 
hazardous cargo moving 
through water ports 
should be more strictly 
enforced 3.88 3.59 2.25” 63.6%
Water ports are secure
from terrorist violence 2.95 2.21 4.94' 57.1%
*1 - strongly disagree; 5 - strongly agree 
“significant at .05 level 
'significant at .01 level
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loss/damage). Improved communication between ports and 
large shippers could sensitize the shippers to the importance of 
trying to put their outbound international shipments in uniform 
container sizes.
The final significant differences among operational vari­
ables indicate that ports and shippers do not agree about the 
location of loss and damage for international shipments. On the 
one hand, ports slightly disagree (mean = 2.68) that cargo losses 
are higher when goods are at water ports than while goods are 
in transit; shippers slightly agree (mean =3.30) that cargo losses 
are more likely at ports. On the other hand, ports slightly agree 
(mean = 3.31) that cargo damage is more likely when goods are 
in transit, while shippers are neutral (mean =2.94) on this issue.
While this information suggests that the disagreement is 
stronger concerning losses than concerning damage, it should 
be noted that neither issue was considered to be important by 
a majority of shippers. A possible explanation is that the shippers 
were asked to evaluate the importance of the various opera­
tional (as well as safety/security) issues based on the exact 
statements appearing in Table 4. As pointed out in Table 3, loss 
and damage performance is a key criteria when shippers select 
a water port; however, the actual location of lost or damaged 
goods (the issues appearing in Table 4) is of lesser importance 
than whether goods are lost or damaged.
Safety and Security Issues. Table 4 also provides informa­
tion on port and shipper evaluations of three safety and security 
issues, along with shipper importance ratings on the issues. Two 
of the three show statistically significant differences between 
ports and shippers, with ports more strongly favoring (mean = 
3.88) stricter packaging requirements for hazardous products 
than do the carriers (mean = 3.59). Moreover, packaging 
standards are considered an important issue by nearly two- 
thirds of the shippers; these standards may raise legal questions 
concerning the responsibility—shippers, carriers, forwarders, 
ports—for errors or accidents that may occur.
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There is also rather strong disagreement between the ports 
and shippers concerning the influence of terrorist violence on 
port operations (an issue important to 57% of the shippers). 
Ports are neutral (mean = 2.95) as to whether or not their 
facilities are secure from terrorist violence, while the shippers 
disagree (mean =2.21) that water ports are safe from such 
actions. Although terrorist activities are, to a large degree, 
uncontrollable, the magnitude of disagreement (almost .75) 
between ports and shippers is a clear indication that port 
management needs to improve at least the perception that their 
facilities are secure from terrorist behavior.
Summary And Conclusions
A central premise of this study is that water ports have 
primarily concentrated their marketing efforts on ocean carri­
ers, neglecting other relevant groups of customers. This neglect 
becomes evident when the responses of ports and one group of 
"neglected" customers are compared on a variety of interna­
tional trade variables. Specifically, this study focuses on a 
comparison of water ports and large U.S. industrial shippers in 
terms of 1) important factors in water port evaluation and 2) 
opinions concerning issues that influence the efficiency of 
international trade.
With respect to port evaluation factors, the locational 
advantages that individual ports previously relied upon are 
diminishing. For example, Virginia's inland port at Front Royal 
is approximately 200 miles from its "parent" ports of Hampton 
Roads. As a result, water ports must attempt to satisfy customer 
needs beyond locational preference. This study found that 
ports tend to overemphasize the ability to handle large volume 
shipments, while underestimating the informational require­
ments of shippers, particularly in terms of claims handling and 
shipment tracing.
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In terms of the contemporary trade issues, shippers and 
ports demonstrated marked disagreements concerning the 
influence of labor regulations on efficient port operations. The 
importance of this issue to shippers (83% felt it to be an 
important issue) also suggests that shippers view labor regula­
tions as more than a minor problem influencing water port 
operation. Furthermore, the shippers suggest that carrier pickup 
and delivery times at water ports take too long, situations that 
may be exacerbated by port labor problems.
Although water ports do not generally view shippers as an 
important customer group, respondents from large U.S. indus­
trial corporations indicated that they play a key role in evaluat­
ing and selecting the water ports used by their companies for 
international distribution. Shippers—especially large ones—are 
actually important water port customers.
Some ports view selected operational (e.g. port pickup and 
delivery times) and safety/security (e.g., terrorist violence) issues 
as uncontrollable factors, which therefore do not need to be 
addressed by port management.4 However, others have recog­
nized that13 "uncontrollable elements...must be considered in 
the planning, implementation and control of the firm's interna­
tional distribution network." The necessity of dealing with these 
uncontrollable factors comes in part from the increasingly 
competitive international distribution environment, which of­
fers shippers a broad array of choices for their cross-border 
shipments.
International shipments that historically moved from water 
port to water port are today facing stiff competition from sea/air 
and sea/truck/air alternatives. At a minimum, these alternatives 
to all-water movements offer the potential for reduced business 
for individual ports. Consequently, water ports might adopt a 
more proactive approach to their customers-including a broader 
delineation of their customers (see Figure 1)—because lost 
business is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reclaim.
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Introduction
There are those who believe that in this thirteenth year of 
airline deregulation that the era of consolidation/merger/acqui­
sition is essentially over in the United States. They are probably 
right because of two reasons. One reason, very simply, is that 
the large number of consolidations, mergers, acquisitions and 
bankruptcies have left very few Major carriers on the competi­
tive playing field. The second reason is that the Department of 
Transportation's (DOT) authority over mergers and agreements 
concerning domestic transportation was sunset on December 
31, 1988. On the surface, this reduced number of domestic 
competitors and the additional freedom from regulation ap­
pears to hold nothing but benefits not only for the American 
airline industry but for its international competitors as well. This 
apparent "windfall" from deregulation will be examined in the 
following pages.
As a case in point, European air carriers see decontrol as 
probably their best weapon in the competitive battle. For 
example, the recently signed Luxembourg II Agreement opened 
up the so-called Fifth Freedom Right which will allow such 
carriers as Aer Lingus, British Airways, Air France, KLM and 
Lufthansa to fly between any two European cities, even if both 
cities are outside their home country.1
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The Airline Industy Before 
And After Deregulation
Since 1985, approximately twenty-five (25) mergers and 
acquisitions have occurred; twenty-three (23) were by major 
carriers.2 There were four Major carriers acquired in 1986: 
Peoples Express, Eastern, Republic, and Western which left only 
nine (9) of the former thirteen (13) Major carriers which has 
been further reduced to eight Majors with the acquisition of 
Piedmont by USAir in 1989.3
If all of this has taken place in approximately two-to-three 
years, what has happened to the industry since deregulation 
began in 1978? In sheer numbers alone, thirty-six (36) carriers 
began nearly a decade of deregulation. If every air carrier that 
stated operation, since deregulation of the air passenger seg­
ment of the industry, were still in operation today, there would 
be a grand total of 234* air carriers. However, bankruptcies, 
mergers, consolidations, and ceased operations have claimed a 
staggering 68.8%; including the consummation of the acquisi­
tion of Piedmont by USAir on August 4, 1 989. Over seventy- 
four (74) carriers certificated as Section 401 scheduled airlines 
remained in January, 1987. EXHIBIT 1 and TABLE 1 tell the 
story pictorially and numerically.
Of the remaining seventy-four (74) Section 401 certificated 
air carriers in January, 1987, a net total of only twenty-five (25) 
compete for airline traffic within the continental (48 contiguous 
states) United States (see TABLE 2). Thirty-six operate outside 
the forty-eight states (in Alaska, Pacific, and the Caribbean) 
while thirteen (13) others provide feeder service to larger 
carriers. None of the original mid-sized Regional carriers certifi­
cated prior to 1978 exist today. Ozark, Frontier, North Central, 
Hugh es Air West, Southern, and Texas International have all 
been acquired. Although Allegheny and Piedmont both ac­
quired Major carrier status by the expansion of their route 
structures, they were both acquired by USAir.5
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The scheduled airlines are divided into three classifications: 
Majors, Nationals, and Regionals. TABLE 3: U.S. SCHEDULED 
AIRLINES, PRE- AND POST-MERCER and EXHIBIT 2: CON­
SOLIDATION OF NATIONALS BETWEEN 1986 AND 1991 
identify the carriers in each classification. Forthesake ofbrevity, 
MAJOR airline companies are those airlines, once referred to as 
trunk carriers, and who are now classified as MAJORS because 
they have annual gross revenues over one billion dollars. 
NATIONAL airline companies are those that generate annual 
gross revenues between $75 million and $1 billion. And while 
REGIONAL airline companies have a history of their own, they 
are classified as LARGE REGIONALS if their annual gross 
revenues fall between $10 million and $75 million and ME­
DIUM REGIONALS if annual gross revenues are less than $10 
million. For 1989, it was estimated that the Majors generated 
429 billion revenue passenger miles (RPMs).6
Sunset of DOT Merger Authority
The sunset of DOT's authority to review mergers under 
Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act does not transfer 
authority to review mergers to the Department of Justice nor to 
any other agency. The bottom line is that airline mergers no 
longer require administrative approval. However, when the 
airline industry lost the necessity for administrative approval, it 
also lost the immunity that airline mergers approved by DOT 
had previously obtained under the antitrust laws. As a result, 
airline mergers that violate the Sherman Antitrust Act and the 
Clayton Act now can be challenged in the courts by the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice or by private parties.7 In 
short, the airline companies are now fully subject to the same 
antitrust rules that govern other American industries except for 
some aspects of international aviation.
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Exhibit 1
Consolidation of Pre-deregulation Trunk 
and Local Airlines into Seven Major Airlines
19 Trunks & Locals - 1978 7 Majors - 1991
AMERICAN -AMERICAN
BRANIEF BANKRUPTCY ("NEW” BRANIFF EMERCED AS 
NATIONAL CARRIER)
CONTINENTAL-------BANKRUPTCY-| (PURCHASED BY TEXAS AIR CORP.
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL---------
EASTERN--------------- (BANKRUPTCY, 3/91)








PAN AMERICAN-r-SOLD PACIFIC DIVISION TO UNITED—BANKRUPTCY 
NATIONAL--------- 1 (12-91)
TRANS WORLD------------ 1--------------------------------------------- TRANS WORID
OZARK----------------------------'
UNITED------------------ BOUGHT PAN AM PACIFIC DIVISION — UNITED





SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM AIRLINE CONSOLIDATION. (WASH., D.C.: AIR­
LINE ECO., INC. 1987) p. 20 AND FAA AVIATION FORECASTS. FISCAL YEARS 
1990-2001. U.S. D.O.T., FED. AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, pp. 121-223.
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Table 1
A Numerical History of U.S. Scheduled Airlines Operating 
Under Section 401 Certificates as of January,1987
Certificated prior to 1978






Merged, Liquidated, Decertificated 




Source: Adapted from Airline Consolidation, (Washington, D C: Air- 
line Economics, Inc. 1987), p. 16. Updated to March, 1991.
Table 2
Total Number Of Carriers Operating
In Continental United States Without Feeder Agreements 
With Larger Carrier(s)
Total carriers currently operating 73
Carriers operating totally outside Continental
U.S. (Alaska, Pacific, and Caribbean <36>
Carriers with feeder agreements <1 3>
Total carriers operating in Continental U.S. 
without feeder Agreement with Larger Carriers 24
Source: Adapted from Airline Consolidation, (Washington. D.C: Air- 
line Economics, Inc. 1987), p. 16. Updated to March, 1991.
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Table 3
U.S. Scheduled Airlines 
Pre- and Post-Merger
Pre-Merger: Maiors (12) Nationals (15) Regionals (4)
American AirCal Air Midwest
Continental Alaska Air Wisconsin
Delta Aloha Atlantic S.E.












Post-Merger:: Major (8) National (8) Regionals (2)
American Air Wisconsin Air Midwest
Delta Alaska Air Croup Atlantic S.E.
Northwest Aloha
Pan American America West
Texas Air Corp. Braniff
Trans World Hawaiian
United Midway - (Bankruptcy, 12-91)
USAir Croup Southwest
Source: Adapted from Dr. C. lames. State of The Airline Industry.
Airline Economices, Inc., Washington, D.C., January, 1990.
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Exhibit 2
Consolidation of Nationals 
Between 1986 and 1991
Start of 1986 Disposition End of 1991
Aircal--------------------------Merged into American
Air Wisconsin -............................................................  Air Wisconsin
Alaska........................................................................ — Alaska
Aloha ..................... ........... ........... -.......-................... Aloha
America West-------------------------------------------- -------America West
American Trans Air ......................................-...........  American Trans Air
Braniff...........................................................................  Braniff
Frontier---------------- Merged into People Express
Hawaiian---------------------------------------------------------- Hawiian
Midway........................ -Bankruptcy, 12-91..........Midway
MCM Grand----- -------.........................-------- ---------- MGM Grand
New York Air-------------Merged into Texas Air Corp.
Ozark........... -................Merged into TWA
Pacific Southwest........Merged into USAir
People Express ............ Merged into Texas Air Corp.
Southwest----------------------- -------------- ------------------  Southwest
Trans America —........Ceased Scheduled Passenger Operations
Transtar....................— Merged into Southwest
World.............................-Ceased Scheduled Passenger Operations
Air Wisconsin.............................................................. Air Wisconsin
Jet America---------------- Bought by Alaska
21 Carriers 10 Carriers
Source: Adapted from Airline Consolidation. (Wash., D.C.: Airline 
Eco., Inc., 1987) p. 20, and FAA Aviation Forecasts. Fiscal Years 1990- 
2001. U.S. D.O.T., Fed. Aviation Administration, pp. 221-223.
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The fact is that, today, not only have the possible combina­
tions among airlines been reduced significantly but if and when 
any mergers are attempted, they will be closely scrutinized by 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, In addition, 
there are relatively few airports that serve as hubs for more than 
one airline. Hubs are airports in major cities/metropolitan areas 
that serve as collection points for passengers and cargo. 
RECIONALS transport passengers and freight from outlying 
areas into a Hub location via spokes (routes). Major and/or 
National airlines complete the move by carrying the passengers 
and/or freight to their final destinations via other spokes (routes). 
As a result of the small number of hubs serving more than one 
airlinecompany, the antitrustanalysiswill likely tend tofocuson 
an assessment of an airline mergers'impact on national concen­
tration levels. However, the more immediate question is "What 
strategies do airline companies develop for one, three, five, and 
ten years in the future that will avoid incurring the wrath of the 
Antitrust Division of DOJ?"
Four alternatives provide a short but non-exclusion list to 
this strategic planning question. (1) One of which is to go "BACK 
TO THE FUTURE!" If we return to the year 1978 when 
deregulation (of the passenger segment of the airline industry - 
air cargo having been deregulated in 1977) - was the WAVE OF 
THE FUTURE, we find that deregulation was to become the 
FUTURE of the airline industry. Although, it is not "JUST" the 
deregulation of the American domestic airline industry that is 
charting the flight plan of domestic and international airline 
operations of the future. It is DOMESTIC DEREGULATION, 
INTERNATIONAL DEREGULATION (e.g., Europe, 1992) and 
WORLD EVENTS (e.g., Iraqi invasion of Kuwaitand subsequent 
United Nations sanctioned trade embargo) of the most recent 
months, weeks, and days.
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The other three alternatives to the strategic planning ques­
tion include the options of (2) developing marketing alliances 
not only with foreign air carriers but with national/global hotel 
and restaurant chains as well; (3) ownership changes (discussed 
later), and even the different forms of (4) frequent flyer 
agreements.
Globalization
Globalization is a strategic alliance alternative for which the 
airline carriers do not have an option if they plan to remain 
competitive. That is, they must globalize their operations simply 
to be able to remain competitive not only with their domestic 
counterparts but with the foreign-based international carriers as 
well. It is a strategic change forced on the industry by domestic 
and international deregulation. Globalization of the U.S. Airline 
industry began in 1977 and 1978 with the deregulation of the 
cargo and passenger segments respectively. Eventually, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and other countries 
experimented with deregulation, liberalization and even 
privatization of their airline industries. It should be remembered 
that deregulation of the airline industry, domestically and 
internationally, has erupted upon the scene as a result of forces 
outside of the control of the airline industry. Globalization is the 
airship flying toward tomorrow; (domestic and international) 
deregulation is the current state-of-the-art fuel being used to 
power the ship; North America and Europe probably were the 
first two passengers on that ship to buy - but not pay for - their 
tickets. Many other passengers (i.e., countries/airline compa­
nies) are scrambling for tickets by jockeying for a position in the 
line that is forming.
The European Common Market added fuel to the fire of 
regulatory liberalization with the Treaty of Rome test of airline 
competition and pricing in the 1986 Nouvelles Frontieres case 
which held that the rules of competition which exist under the
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Treaty of Rome do, indeed, apply to aviation. At that point, the 
FUTURE was developing around an attempt to foster overall 
economic airline integration in Europe which would set up a 
chain reaction around the world.8
As a result, North America and Europe, two of the three 
major developed regions of the world, are moving rapidly to 
structurally change air transportation into an arena of open 
competition by initiating strategic alternatives available to them 
in the deregulated world of the airline industry. Airline compa­
nies in the rest of the world, including the less developed 
regions, are searching for and signing up partners with whom to 
dance to the new tune the world is now playing. As a result of 
domestic and international deregulation, mergers, consolida­
tions, and bankruptcies, these relationships between the airline 
companies are developing into important strategic alternatives 
identified earlier; (1) marketing alliances, (2) ownership changes, 
and the (3) frequent flyer agreements.
Analysis of Globalized Strategies 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Of the many types of alliances available to enterprising 
airline companies, the three most important are Marketing, 
Equity and Frequent Flyer Programs. The last few years has 
seen a dramatic increase in all three types. Out of one-hundred, 
seventy-two alliances identified by Mead Jennings in the Au­
gust, 1990 issue of AIRLINE BUSINESS, eighty-two of the 
agreements (47.67%) involved equity investments. More spe­
cifically, fifty-six per cent of these 82 agreements were made in 
the last five years (see TABLE 6, APPENDIX). TABLE 4 is an 
abstract of the strategic alliances of the U.S. domestic air carriers 
with domestic and foreign-based air carriers. An example is the 
first truly “global" alliance between Delta, Singapore and 
Swissair which includes the coordination of international fares 
and flight schedules, the loaning of flight attendants and the 
possibility of joint buying opportunities.9
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Marketing Alliances
In the category of Marketing Alliances, we find the British 
Airways and United agreement to coordinate schedules and to 
share codes of international flights; but no equity swaps. Carried 
to an extreme, one would find a route-specific agreement 
which refers to an agreement between two airlines regarding 
the contribution of each airline to a cooperative effort over a 
specific route (e.g. New York to London). The equity swap - 
another name for alliance partners buying into each other - is 
a relatively new variation on the much older marketing alliance 
theme. It is interesting to note that American Airlines serves as 
a partner to seven other major airlines; Aer Lingus, Air New 
Zealand, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Malev, Qantas, and Singapore 
Airlines. American has picked up an equity position (7.5%) in 
only one of these airlines; Air New Zealand. Conversely, these 
same seven airlines serve as partners for American with Air New 
Zealand holding a 7.5% equity position in American Airlines. 
Among these seven partners, American has only one wide- 
ranging marketing alliance with Qantas. The other six alliances 
are route-or market-specific agreements.
TABLE 4 provides some insight into the relationships that 
have been established among the airline companies of the 
world and U.S. airline companies. The last column indicates 
what kind of relationship exists between any two carriers;"M" 
means there is a wide-ranging marketing alliance agreement 
between the two carriers; "R" means the agreement covers 
only a specific route/market; "J" means there is a joint venture 
between the two firms; "C" means the agreement is for cargo 
only and "MAN" means there is a management contract in 
existence.10
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Table 4
Stategic Alliances









AER LINGUS AMERICAN R
AEROFLOT PAN AM M
AIR CANADA TWA M
AIR-INDIA TWA R
AIR MICRONESIA ALOHA 10
CONTINENTAL 30
AIR NEW ZEALAND AMERICAN 7.5
ALITALIA USAIR M
ALL NIPPON TWA R
ALOHA AIR MICRONESIA 10
AMERICAN AER LINCUS R






AMERICA WEST ANSETT 20
ANSETT AMERICA WEST 20
AUSTRALIAN UNITED R
BRITISH AW DELTA R
UNITED M
CANADIAN AIR. MIDWAY R
CATHAY PACIFIC AMERICAN R
CONTINENTAL AIR MICRONESIA 30
SAS 9.9 M
KEY: * = PLANNED; **=SUBJECT TO REGULATORY APPROVAL; M =WIDE-
RANGINC MARKETING ALLIANCE; REROUTE OR MARKET SPECIFIC ALLI­
ANCE; J=JOINT VENTURE; C=CARGO; MAN =MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
SOURCE: Jennings, Mead. “Strategic Illusions", AIRLINE BUSINESS. August, 
1990, pages 27, 28 & 30.










DELTA BRITISH AW R
SINGAPORE 2.8 M
SWISSAIR 5 4.6 M
FINNAIR AMERICAN R
GULF AIR TWA R
HAWAIIAN JAPAN AL 25





MIDWAY CANADIAN AL R
NORTHWEST KLM 14.9
PAN AM AEROFLOT M
PHIl IPPINE Al TWA R
QANTAS AMERICAN AL M
SAS CONTINENTAL 9.9 M
SINGAPORE AL AMERICAN R
DELTA 5 2.8






KEY: * = PLANNED; **=SUBJECT TO REGULATORY APPROVAL; M =WIDE-
RANGING MARKETING ALLIANCE; R = ROUTE OR MARKET SPECIFIC ALLI­
ANCE; J=JOINT VENTURE; C=CARGO; MAN=MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
SOURCE: Adpated from: Jennings, Mead. “Strategic Illusions", AIRLINE BUSI­
NESS. August, 1990, pages 2 7, 28 & 30.
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Equity Alliances
It is sometimes difficult to separate the new variation . . . 
equity partnerships .. . from the old marketing alliance theme. 
The practice of alliance partners buying into each other has 
quickly gained acceptance in the airline industry even though 
the strategy is expensive and time consuming. Delta holds a 5% 
equity in Swissair who holds a 4.6% equity in Delta. The 
reciprocal 7.5% equity holdings of American and Air New 
Zealand were mentioned earlier. The largest equity holdings 
are the reciprocal amounts of Air Micronesia and Continental 
Airlines at 30% each. Japan Air Lines and Hawaiian Airlines run 
a close second with 25% each. The smallest equity positions are 
those of Singapore and Delta Airline Companies at 2.8% each. 
These equity holdings are looked upon by some as a method of 
cementing the relationship between two airlines for the long 
run. Those who oppose equity swaps do not see the need for 
the investments. To the opponents, the in vestments are nothing 
more than wasted management time and an inappropriate use 
of investors' money. To many, equity alliances are becoming 
a symptom of airlines in distress. Others see them as defensive 
postures which Delta readily admits that the 5% stakes it sold to 
Singapore and Swissair helped to fend off take over attempts 
which were in the wings just before the alliance took place.
To understand more clearly why the industry feels there is 
a need for marketing and equity alliances, a look at the industry 
in terms of traffic and capacity should provide some clues.
Frequent Flyer Program/Alliances
How can an airline play the passenger number-game and 
win? However an airline wins new customers - merger, consoli­
dation, buyout, takeover, route purchase, new authority, dis­
count fares, or other promotional programs-it must retain them 
as customers. One of the current favorite methods is the 
frequent flyer program. This program allows a passenger to bank 
his/her flight miles for the purpose of qualifying for a free trip for 
the passenger, his/her spouse or children, free rental cars, hotel 
accommodations or some other discounted fare.
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For instance, Delta Air Lines' frequent flyer program is 
supported by a partnership agreement with Air Canada, Air 
New Zealand, Japan Airlines, Lufthansa, KLM Royal Dutch 
Airlines, Singapore Airlines and Swissair. These air carriers, 
except Japan Airlines, allow the passenger to earn 100% of their 
actual mileage in Economy Class; from 125% to 150% in 
Business Class and 1 50% to 200% in First Class.
Delta also has partnership agreements with Alamo, Avis 
and National car rental firms. For those needing to spend the 
night, the agreement extends to Hyatt Hotels, Marriott Hotels, 
Preferred Hotels, Trusthouse Forte or Hilton Hotels/Hilton 
International. Passengers are eligible to earn 1,000 miles bonus 
credit each from the car rental firm and/or hotel.
Delta also extends an invitation to join the Crown Room 
Club which offers an array of services, complimentary bever­
ages, meeting areas for business associates and special travel 
services ranging from assistance with check-in, seat assignments 
and boarding passes to personal check cashing privileges. Single 
membership is available at $1 50.00 per year; $200 for a 
member with spouse or the deduction of 30,000 miles from the 
member's Frequent Flyer mileage for one year single member­
ship or 40,000 miles deduction for member with spouse.
Continental Airlines' Frequent Flyer Program is called 
ONEPASS and includes the following partners: Continental 
Express, Aer Lingus, Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, 
Sabena, SAS and The Trump Shuttle. Continental allows a 
passenger who doesn't have sufficient mileage for a specific 
reward to "lock in" the current mileage level required for 
qualification for a period of up to three years or until his account 
accrues the required mileage. A passenger who is short on 
mileage for a particular reward, may purchase up to 20% of the 
necessary mileage for $20 per 1000 miles.
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Continental also has agreements with several car rental 
firms. These include National, Europcar, Tilden, General Hertz 
and Thrifty. Its hotel accommodations include Marriott, Camino 
Real, Westin, (Compri) Hotels by Doubletree, Consort, 
Doubletree Hotels, The Radisson Hotels, and Wyndham Ho­
tels. These hotels offer 500 miles per stay at the published retail 
or corporate rate.
United Airlines has a large compliment of partner firms 
through which a passenger can earn Frequent Flyer mileage. Of 
the airlines, these include Air France, Alitalia, Aloha Airlines, 
Aloha Island Air, British Airways, Iberia Airlines of Spain, KLM 
Royal Dutch Airlines, Lufthansa German Airlines, SABENA 
World Airlines, SAS, and Swissair. A 25% mileage bonus is 
available for a paid Business Class reservation and 50% bonus 
for paid First Class travel on United.
If a passenger charges his flight ticket, he will receive one 
mile for every dollar charged to a Mileage Plus, First Card Visa, 
Mileage Plus First Card Gold, Master Card Gold, or United 
Airlines Travel Card.
Participatingcarriers with American Airlines include Ameri­
can Eagle, British Airways, Cathay Pacific Airways, Qantas 
Airways, and Singapore Airlines.
American's car rental agreements include Avis and Hertz. 
Hotels accommodations are available through Hilton Hotels 
and Resorts, Inter Continental Hotels, Forum Hotels, ITT 
Sheraton, Marriott Hotels and Resorts and Wyndham Hotels 
and Resorts. Frequent Flyer Passengers can earn 500 mileage 
credits per night and a complimentary split of champagne by 
providing his/her "AAdvantage" number upon check-in at any 
Inter Continental or Forum Hotel. These mileage credits can be 
earned for up to seven consecutive nights per property (hotel) 
per calendar month.
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USAir, in addition to its Frequent Flyer Program which 
seems to be a stand-alone program that is not associated with 
any other airline company, has segmented its total market into 
several sub-markets. Two of the more prominent segmented 
programs are Military Fares and Senior Savers. Military person­
nel on active duty and their dependents can get 50% discounts 
off regular coach fares to cities in the United States and Puerto 
Rico. Dependents are eligible for 50% discounts even if they are 
not traveling with their active duty family member. Substantial 
discounts of up to 75% of economy class fares are offered to and 
from European destinations.
For those 62 years of age or older, USAir offers two special 
ways to save on flights; 10% discounted Senior Saver Fare and 
Golden Opportunities Coupon Books which come in two 
packages of four one-way coupons for $473 or eight one-way 
coupons for $790. A number of restrictions apply which tend to 
reduce the overall benefits.
In addition to strategic alliances, there are many other 
methods available to carry out perceived future market oppor­
tunities. In addition, to those already mentioned - mergers and 
acquisitions; geographical (regional) alliances; marketing alli­
ances, computer reservations system (CRS) consortia - must be 
added the formulation of trading blocs such as the “United 
States of Europe - the European Economic Community (EEC) of 
1992" and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) which is the 
EEC's largest trading partner with six countries (Austria, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden & Switzerland).11
In Europe, London's two main airports, Heathrow and 
Gatwick, lie at the heart of a global network of air services. They 
are the two busiest international airports in the world.12 Britain 
also has more than 20 major regional airports - serving such 
cities as Belfast, Birmingham, Cardiff, Glasgow, Leeds, Manches­
ter and Newcastle. Tying into an extensive domestic network, 
they also have direct international links.13
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Together, Britain's airports handle over 7,000 international 
flights each week. They also service about 5,000 domestic 
flights per week, many of them "shuttles" - linking the United 
Kingdom's (UK) major commercial and industrial centers within 
one hour's flying time of each other.14
There are more than fifty (50) airlines operating in the 
United Kingdom, handling approximately 26 million passen­
gers annually and, in 1988, the UK's airports shipped nearly 800 
thousand tons of cargo.15
However, there are only three domestic carriers in the 
United States that are already putting the various alliances, 
mentioned above, together and who have the best chance of 
survival and profitability over the long term; i.e., American, 
Delta and United (assuming someone can clear up United's 
ownership confusion in the very near future). These three 
airlines have the greatest probability of survival and profitability 
because they have the CRSs, the large dispersed hubs, the 
equipment is either on hand or on order, and their international 
routes are growing 16
American has gradually become (along with Pan Am, until 
it ceased operations in December, 1991) the major U.S. Carrier 
in Miami, American Airlines has a 29-point Caribbean system 
that is the largest of any domestic airline and is closing ground 
on Eastern Airlines' old Latin network by receiving, on March 8, 
1990, clearance from the Justice Department to purchase 
Eastern's Latin routes. The $349 million sale must still be 
approved by the Department of Transportation and the federal 
bankruptcy court overseeing Eastern's re-organization. The 
new authority will give American Airlines control of a 20-city 
network in Central and South America.17
By comparison, British Airways and Air France have posi­
tioned themselves better than even American, Delta or United 
since they command over 95% of their home markets, com­
pared to the 1 5% - 1 8% controlled by American or Delta.18
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Other European carriers are following British Airways' and 
major U.S. air carriers' lead who are rushing to gain access to 
Western European gateways before 1992. For instance, KLM 
took a large stake in Northwest and a small share of Air UK. 
Swissair and SAS have agreed to take a 10% share of each other 
while Air France and Lufthansa have formed their own alli­
ance.19
The smaller carriers must rely on international traffic to 
grow and are being very creative in reaching for ownership and 
alliances. For example, SAS isnow allied with Continental in the 
U.S.; Lan-Chile in South America; Swissair in Europe to tap the 
Middle East and Africa; and Thai in Asia. Another strategy of 
SAS's Jan Carlzon is that he has adopted former United 
Chairman Dick Ferris's concept of building a door-to-door 
travel network with hotels, reservations systems and car rentals. 
All of this links together information distribution systems, 
ground transportation systems and airport ground services. 
Very simply, SAS's Chairman Carlzon intends to capture the 
passenger from the moment he leaves the home or office to the 
moment he returns.20
Tactical Implementation of Strategies
North America and Europe are the two major powers in the 
move toward a globalized airline industry. Europeans are using 
the tactic of dividing U.S. air carriers to capture U.S. market 
share with various alliances. The tactic is working because it is 
often in the interest of individual U.S. carriers to build interna­
tional ties with foreign operators even though such action will 
undermine their own U.S. competition. It is the highly competi­
tive atmosphere that allows U.S. carriers to be segmented by 
foreign carriers and this segmentation process makes it easier to 
access U.S. markets through these ownership and marketing 
alliances.21
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For example, a foreign carrier looks for two U.S. domestic 
carriers which are competing for traffic originating within the 
United States but which has a foreign destination through an 
international departure point in the United States. The foreign 
carrier creates an alliance with the U.S. carrier which cannot fly 
out of that departure point to international destinations. As a 
result, the foreign carrier obtains (at least part of) the interna­
tional traffic rather than the other U.S. carrier that did have 
international operating authority.
In this situation, European carriers hold a significant com­
petitive advantage because domestic competition, while in­
tense in the United States among air carriers, is virtually non­
existent among the major foreign carriers since there is essen­
tially only one large carrier in each home market. Therefore, if 
a U.S. air carrier wants to create an alliance with a foreign carrier 
overseas and the foreign carrier says "NO", the U.S. carrier has 
no option and, very simply, has no access to that specific 
market.22
On the other hand, if one domestic carrier in a U.S. market 
(Hub) says "NO" to an alliance proposal of a foreign carrier, 
there are often as many as seven (7) or eight (8) other U.S. 
domestic carriers with whom the foreign carrier can create 
alliances or take an equity position. Financially more important, 
if the foreign carrier can develop an alliance, the market 
accessed by the foreign carrier can often rival the size of its home 
market. For example, British Airways (B.A.) Deputy Chairman 
Colin Marshall calls its agreement with United "the best rela­
tionship of any two airlines." (and) "We are very complemen­
tary and the combination of the two from a marketing stand­
point makes all the sense it did originally." The reason that it 
does make good sense for the foreign carrier is because British 
Airway's agreement with United gives it access to 48% of the 
world's international scheduled passenger traffic when, other­
wise, it would only have access to 1 7% of that market!23 
Speaking of markets for air travel, just how does the United 
States compare with Europe?
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United States versus Europe, et al
EXHIBIT 3 illustrates the point that U.S. Majors accounted 
for 330 million or 39.3% of the passengers enplaning world 
carrier systems in 1988. It also compares the United States 
(Major) carriers with two other categories; European Common 
Market (E. E.C.) - including the European FreeTrade Association 
EFTA). The European Common Market, including the EFTA, 
enplaned only 145 million (out of 840 total enplaned passen­
gers) customers for a 1 7.3% share of the market. All other world 
carriers enplaned a total of 365 passengers for a 43.4% share of 
this lucrative market which must be split among a number of 
smaller carriers. Carried one step further, EXHIBIT 4 illustrates 
the percentage of total traffic (Shown on the left-hand Y-axis) for 
six geographical areas- North America, Domestic[N.A.(D)]; Far 
East (F.East); Europe (Intercontinental); North America (Inter­
national); Europe-lntra, and a miscellaneous category of Oth­
ers. Exhibit 4 also estimates the growth experienced in 1989 
and forecasts the expected growth for a six-year period (1990 
-1995) for these areas. It is interesting to note that the Far East 
had the greatest estimated percentage growth in 1989 and is 
expected also to again be the leader in growth during the six- 
year period 1990 - 1995. Ignoring the category of "Others", 
Europe (intercontinental) is forecasted to be second in growth 
and North America (International) third behind the first two 
positions.
Yet the first five positions, in rank order, of net increase in 
international passenger enplanements are staffed with two 
foreign air carriers, British Airway and Lufthansa. EXHIBIT 5 
shows that the second five positions have only two American air 
carriers, Continental and Pan Am. One might say that as far as 
enplanements are concerned American air carriers are only 
handling fifty percent while the other half is being shared by a 
number of different countries.
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American air carriers do not fare much better in a ranking 
of the top 50 airline companies by profits. Table 5 indicates that 
only two American airlines - United and American - were 
numbers one and two, respectively, out of the top five airlines; 
Alitalia, Cathay Pacific, and British Airways occupied third, 
fourth, and fifth places, respectively.
In the second group of five airline companies, the United 
States again had only two representatives - Delta and Trans 
World - who occupied the sixth and eight places, respectively. 
And once again, the other three positions were held by firms 
from foreign countries; Singapore (7), Iberia (9), and Air France 
(10). Therefore, only four American carriers are ranked in the 
ten most profitable air carriers in the world, The other six 
positions are held by air carriers from six different countries. 
Competition, based on profitability on a global basis, is cur­
rently alive and doing very well!
When ranked by passengers enplaned in 1988, the United 
States air carriers occupied three of the top five positions; 
United (1), American (3), and Delta (4). Trans World Airlines (6) 
and British Airways (7) were the only other air carriers that were 
ranked in the top ten most profitable carriers that were also 
ranked in the top ten carriers when ranked by enplaned 
passengers in 1988. In other words, five of the most profitable 
airline carriers were more economical in operating their com­
panies than five other companies that carried more passengers 
but made less profit. For example, Texas Air was ranked 46th 
in profitability but 2nd in the number of passengers carried. Pan 
American ranked 43rd in profitability but 9th in passengers 
enplaned.
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Table 5
The Top 50 Airline Companies 
Ranked by Profits and Passenger Miles
(Billions)
(Millions) 1988 Passenger 
Company & Rank/Profit Country '88 Profits Miles and Rank
1. United Air Lines U.S. $1, 124.3 69.1 (1)
2. American Air Lines U.S. 476.8 64.8 (3)
3. Alitalia Italy 368.6
4. Cathay Pacific Hong Kong 361.6
5. British Airways Britain 331.3 30.5 (7)
6. Delta U.S. 306.8 49.1 (4)
7. Singapore Singapore 299.0
8. Trans World U.S. 249.7 34.8 (6)
9. Iberia Spain 208.2
10. Air France France 193.5
1 2. USAir Croup U.S. 30.4 (8)
1 4. Japan Air Lines Japan 28.3 (10)
1 7. Northwest Airlines U.S. 40.1 (5)
43. Pan American U.S. 29.0 (9)
46. Texas Air U.S. 69.0 (2)
Source: Woods, Wilton. "Revolution in the Air", Fortune. January 
1, 1990, pp. 58-59.
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Specifically, in the international market, we find that U.S. 
Majors - as illustrated in EXHIBIT 6 - carried only 35 million of 
the total 294 million international passengers in 1988. This 
represented only 1 2% of the total while the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the Europe Free Trade Area (EFTA), and the 
Eastern Europe carrier system accounted for 91 million passen­
gers or 31% of the total, Other carriers accounted for the 
balance of 168 million (57%).
EXHIBIT 7 shows the relative market position of the 
European Common Market air carriers in terms of enplaned 
passengers. British Airways (B.A.) leads the group with 23 
million enplaned passengers in 1988 for a market share of 21 % 
of the 107 million total passengers. Sabena Airlines had the 
smallest share of only 1.8% or 2 million enplaned passengers. 
Iberia, Air France, and Alitalia were all tied for third place with 
14% representing 15 million enplaned passengers. Lufthansa 
was second with 16.8% (18 million passengers), a full 4.2% 
behind first place British Airways.
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) did not have 
the volume of passengers but competition was thriving never­
theless. Of the total 26.8 million passengers, SAS enjoyed a 
49.6% (1 3.3 million passengers) share of the market. Swissair 
enplaned 7.1 million passengers for a 26.49% market share. A 
distant third place was held by Finnair (14.2% market share with 
3.8 million passengers) which enplaned only 53.5% of the 
volume enjoyed by Swissair and less than a third (28.6%) of the 
volume of SAS Airlines. Fourth and fifth places were occupied 
by Austrian Airlines (1.8 passengers or 6.7%) and Icelandair (.8 
passengers or 2.98%) respectively (see EXHIBIT 8).
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Impact of Domestic and Global Factors
The impact of all of these factors is that airline management 
must recognize that one of the areas of the FUTURE for the 
airline industry will be in GLOBALIZATION - WHICH IS BEING 
FOSTERED ON THE AIRLINE COMMUNITY BY DEREGULA­
TION ON A DOMESTIC AND AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL - 
as witnessed by American's purchase of Eastern's Latin America 
routes; THE EQUITY POSITIONS BEING TAKEN BY NUMER­
OUS AIRLINE COMPANIES IN OTHER MEMBERS OF THE 
AIRLINE COMMUNITY ON A WORLD-WIDE BASIS; the 
marketing alliances being developed between U.S. domestic 
airlines and foreign carriers; joint computer reservations sys­
tems, and the deregulation of the European Economic Commu­
nity by 1992 are only a few examples of the move to globalization.
Management must not be mislead by the apparent increase 
in the intensity of competition amongcarriers. As time wears on, 
and it is found that more and more marketing alliances are 
developed by once competing carriers; AS MORE AIR CARRI­
ERS BECOME OWNERS OF OTHER AIR CARRIERS, as a few 
forced mergers (because of economic circumstances - Pan Am 
has lost $1.1 billion since 1 984)24 take place and as individual 
carriers stake out their respective niches, the industry will 
actually experience less competition. More specifically, the 
FUTURE of the airline industry is going to impact management 
by demanding more creative responses to such things as:
1. Fare increases that are probable not only over the next 
few months but over the next few years. This will be true 
especially in those markets in which carriers experience very 
little or no competition, However, management should be 
cautious in increasing its fares in markets where virtually no 
competition exists because of the possibility of pricing itself out 
of the market by driving the customers to other modes of 
transportation and/or attracting the attention of federal regula­
tors who still harbor the notion that the airline industry should 
be re-regulated.
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2. Even with increasing fares, service is likely to remain 
about the same - not withstanding USAir's President stating that 
" - (Service is) at the top of the heap right now."; in addition to 
the fact that USAir was FIRST in being LAST in ON-TIME 
ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES until most recently when it 
moved from LAST to FIRST! Managerially, costs must be kept 
in line in relation to revenue. However, the reduction of 
passenger services will likely draw the ire of the flyer unless the 
fare is reduced appropriately and the passenger knows when he 
purchases his ticket that it is a "No-Frills" flight. If this is not the 
case, management must become adept at "Non-Price" compe­
tition and communicate to the potential passenger the values 
he/she will receive for the price paid for the ticket; e,g., a larger 
selection of flight schedules, fewer (or no) changes between 
origin and destination, wider seats, ground services, etc.
3. Ownership is going to be the key to the future develop­
ment of worldwide airline services according to the recent 
trends in airline ownership through equity alliances. You can 
find the future survivors if you find the owners of other airlines, 
hubs, computer reservation systems (CRS's), and new equip­
ment. Ownership provides greater control than marketing 
alliances. Major examples include: DELTA'S 5% equity swap 
with Swissair and Singapore; AMERICAN'S do-it-yourself phi­
losophy (even though it owns a piece of Air New Zealand); 
KLM's partial ownership of NORTHWEST and 20% of SABENA 
and SAS which hasa piece, it seems, of almost everybody -9.9% 
of Texas Air; unspecified portions of Lan-Chile and Thai; 24% 
of Airlines of Britain which is currently seeking authority through 
British Midlands. A financial link of 5%-10% has been proposed 
between SAS and Swissair, Both of these airlinesare establishing 
links with Finnairin order to serve the Eastern European market. 
While the Austrian government has reduced its share of Austrian 
Airlines to 51 %, Swissair is attempting to increase its share from 
the current 8% to 10%; All Nippon has 3.5% which it hopes to 
increase to 5%; Air France has 1.5% and Lufthansa has shown 
interest in taking a 10% share.25
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Management should be aware that changes in the owner­
ship of airline companies could mean significant changes in the 
labor market. One possibility is that fewer managerial jobs might 
be available in the domestic market while employment oppor­
tunities could well increase on the international level. This could 
demand increased mobility of airline employees not only within 
the continental United States but globally also. Management 
should prepare for the eventual negotiation of labor contracts 
that cross continental borders for all levels of employees.
4. Another important consideration for management as 
both marketing and equity alliances increase in popularity si 
control. Equity, as mentioned, allows for reciprocal marketing 
practices over which control can be exerted by the owning 
partner(s). That control can easily be extended to the marketing 
alliances and the marketing function of pricing. Management 
will have to be extremely careful to avoid even the appearance 
of collusion in pricing practices. Deregulation was implemented 
because their was a desire to increase competition. Deregula­
tion removes external controls over many marketing practices 
which the industry and its individual members are now going to 
have to police.
5. The FUTURE for the airline industry? Probably five or six 
mega-worldwide carriers by the year 2000 with each having a 
subsidiary operation in North America, Europe and Asia. There 
will be niche airlines, largely state owned or under state 
controls, operating in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. 
These niche airlines will, of course, avoid free market compe­
tition as much as possible. In order to avoid this free market 
competition as much as possible, management must develop its 
expertise in market segmentation through the practice of 
Market Targeting (identifying the specific market(s) to be 
served) and Target Marketing (developing a marketing mix - 
product differentiation - that appears to satisfy the demands of 
each specific market).
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6. Those air carriers surviving in the year 2000 will fall into 
one of three categories: (1) Proactive (Examples: American, 
British Airways, Delta, United, Air France), (2) Active: Wait- 
and-See (Examples: Northwest, Continental, Iberia), and (3) 
Reactive (Examples: Niche carriers such as Singapore, Swissair 
and others from Africa, Latin America and the Middle East).26 
Management will decide into which of these three categories its 
airline company will participate by the goals, strategies, and 
action plans it develops. Butthe important point is that manage­
ment must make a decision or, at least, recognize the decision 
that has been forced upon it by the strategies that have been 
developed. If management does not make a conscious deci­
sion, competition will force it into one of these categories by 
forcing the company to take specific managerial actions regard­
ing such things as passengers fares, service, and flight schedules. 
It is always more convenient to decide a competitive issue than 
to have it decided by competitors.
Conclusion
Macro-industry analysis tells us that the major U.S. players 
in the game will be reduced in number. This reduction contin­
ues in the month of December, 1991 as two more carriers are 
lost to bankruptcy: Midway and Pan American. However, 
macro-analysis also tells us that the airline industry will become 
more globalized and that competition on this level will increase 
significantly. Deregulation was once the future of the airlines. 
But deregulation led to competition at home and abroad. It now 
appears that nearly the whole world wants a piece of the action. 
Out of the ten most profitable airline companies in the world, 
the United States claimed only four positions; the First, Second, 
Sixth, and Eighth. The other six slots represented six different 
countries - Italy, Hong Kong, Britain, Singapore, Spain, and 
France. When ranked by passenger miles, INSTEAD OF PROF­
ITABILITY, one-half of the top-ten companies changed their
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positions. The U.S. maintained its four positions but was only 
able to place a firm in the First, Third, Fourth, and Sixth 
rankings.
Part of the answer to the question is that airline companies 
are going to have to BECOME INVOLVED IN STRATEGIC 
PLANNING IN ORDER TO DEVELOP STRATEGIES OF 
GLOBALIZATION FOR EACH OF ITS MARKETS AND FOR 
THE COMPANY AS A WHOLE -A MASTER STRATEGY, IF YOU 
WILL. With the United States accounting for 330 million or 
39.3% of the passengers enplaning world carrier systems in 
1988, the world is beating a path to the front door of America 
(i.e., "THEY” . . . NOT "WE” . . . are developing marketing 
alliances with American airlinecompanies). Those whocan't get 
in the front door head for the back door (they buy a piece of an 
American airline firm); look for a window (share a computer 
reservations system - CRS) to squeeze through or simply buy out 
the entire company.
However, once the hype has diminished, the economic 
analyses have been completed, the mashing and gashing of 
teeth have subsided; the moaning and groaning have ceased; 
the knuckle cracking has been silenced, and finger pointing is a 
thing of the past, we will find that the air under the wings of the 
future of the airline industry will be provided by four elements: 
(1) Fares, (2) Service (MARKETING ALLIANCES), (3) Ownership 
(EQUITY ALLIANCES) and FREQUENT FLYER PROGRAM AL­
LIANCES. Given these four elements; given the direction of the 
industry today and baring interference by governmental bodies 
(i.e., baring a return to re-regulation), we sill see that there will 
be true worldwide mega-carriers by the year 2000. Whether 
mega-carriers will provide additional services, conveniences, 
lower fares, a greater variety of destinations or whether they will 
be regional/hub monopolies with high fares, limited services 
and fewer destinations remains to be seen.
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TABLE 6
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Carrier Partner
Carrier's Partner's
Equity In Equity In Pact
Partner(%) Carrier(%)
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KEY: * = PLANNED; **=SUBJECT TO REGULATORY APPROVAL; M = WIDE- 
RANGINC MARKETING ALLIANCE; R = ROUTE OR MARKET SPECIEIC ALLI­
ANCE; j = JOINT VENTURE; C=CARCO; MAN=MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
SOURCE: Jennings, Mead. "Strategic Illusions", AIRLINE BUSINESS. August, 
1990, pages 27, 28 & 30.
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ANCE; J=JOINT VENTURE; C = CARCO; MAN =MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
SOURCE: Jennings, Mead. "Strategic Illusions", AIRLINE BUSINESS. August, 
1990, pages 27, 28 & 30.
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Introduction
The transportation industry is making rapid changes to 
accommodate the Just-In-Time (JIT) quick response inventory 
practices that many of their customers are currently using or are 
implementing. These JIT production methods, made popular 
by the Japanese, are quite different than previous inventory and 
production methods.
Under JIT practices, parts and raw materials necessary to 
complete finished products are either produced or arrive at the 
assembly site just as they are needed within the production 
process. The system is designed to meet the precise demands 
of customers for various products with minimum delay and 
minimal inventories of raw materials, finished goods, and work 
in process. For JIT to operate successfully, several requirements 
must be met. All parts must be of a high quality with zero 
incoming defects. These parts must arrive where, when, and in 
the exact quantity needed. Also, the parts that are received must 
be of consistent quality, and finally, the finished product must 
be immediately shipped to the final consumer in order to 
minimize finished goods inventory and the associated holding 
cost.
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If implemented properly, JIT can substantially increase 
product quality and reduce inventory, cycle time, scrap, lot 
sizes, floor space requirements, setup time, and down time for 
all JIT channel members including suppliers, manufacturers, 
wholesalers, and retailers. However, JIT involves more than just 
the changes on the factory floor. As lot sizes decrease, compa­
nies are demanding more frequent, consistent deliveries of a 
smaller quantity of raw materials. They also require finished 
products to be delivered to their customers as soon as possible. 
With the move toward minimizing all inventories, transporta­
tion companies are now seen as a major player in the JIT system. 
In the initial stages of JIT implementation, planning is less precise 
due to lack of data for accurate forecasting so companies still 
demand the more time-sensitive transportation and delivery 
modes. As the JIT system evolves and planning and forecasting 
control improves, companies begin to move to the less time- 
sensitive and less expensive modes of transportation.
The successful transportation companies of the future will 
have to expand their operations to better serve their JIT 
customers' changing transportation needs. Today's individual 
transportation segments will begin to merge together to form 
one-stop-shipping companies. The future of this industry will 
belong to these conglomerates that were once firms in a single 
transportation segment. These merged firms will encompass all 
modes of transportation including air, trucking, rail, and water 
delivery services.
From the shipper's locus of control and point of view, these 
full-service transportation companies will be a vast improve­
ment over what is being offered today. Since the shippers will 
only have to deal with a single source for their transportation 
needs, they will no longer have to make the detailed arrange­
ments for their many shipments with multiple transportation 
companies. From a competitive standpoint, these conglomer­
ates will be providing more services and a more complete level 
of service; thus freeing up time and worry over shipment 
coordination for shippers. The sole responsibility will lie with
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one transportation company to pick up all deliveries (packages, 
letters, boxes, cartons, containers, bulk cargo, etc.) and carry 
them to their final destination. The transportation supplier can 
combine multimodal transportation services to save the cus­
tomer both time and money. This allows "peace of mind" for 
the shipper and will eliminate the need to have one transpor­
tation provider for air express needs, another for rail, another 
for truck deliveries and still another for water transportation 
needs.
From the transportation company's point of view, diversi­
fication will open new markets and should lead to increased 
transportation synergy within the firm. In addition to economies 
of scale, new economies of scope will provide an enhanced 
range of flexibility for the transportation conglomerate. This 
flexibility will allow the transportation provider to better serve 
the new market segments available with a wider range of 
services from a single firm. These new conglomerate firms will 
consist of all the delivery modes from overnight air express 
delivery to water transportation, as well as warehousing ser­
vices, transportation and warehouse consultation, package 
tracking and a wide variety of other transportation-related 
services.
This paper will analyze this blueprint of the future transpor­
tation industry and analyze how the role of the transportation 
industry will change with respect to the changing needs of the 
JIT shipper. The paper will outline how the various modes of 
transportation, merged to form a one-stop-shipping company, 
will eventually become the industry standard, particularly if 
transportation companies want to sustain a competitive edge.
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The Transportation Environment
The current shipping environment is strong for all the 
various industries providing transportation services. There has 
been growth in the air cargo and air express divisions as well as 
a significant rise is trucking volume and revenues. Operating 
revenues for rail traffic and water transportation is increasing 
with growing U.S. exports and imports from Japan, the Pacific 
Rim, and the European Community. Each of these transporta­
tion services and their progress toward concentric diversifica­
tion will be discussed below.
Air Cargo and Air Express
The outlook for the air cargo and air express industry is 
promising because many national economies are expanding 
and there is an increased acceptance and desirability of air 
freight distribution methods. In addition, overnight and second- 
day air deliveries are becoming increasingly popular ("Shippers 
Choose Air...", 1989).
Deregulation in the late 1970's contributed to the high 
growth rate of air cargo capacity for several years, but today, 
though still remaininghigh, thenumberof carriers is decreasing. 
Continuing competition with a stable pricing environment has 
brought about air cargo consolidation. The consolidation and 
mergers between air express air cargo firms, like the one 
between Federal Express and Flying Tiger Lines, has formed 
additional marketing alliances between domestic and foreign 
carriers with new routes and services being created.
Competitors within the air cargo market are the all-cargo 
carriers, which includes specialists in the air express delivery of 
heavy shipments and passenger carriers which haul cargo in the 
belly of passenger aircrafts. For cargo services, profits are still 
smaller than those of passenger service, but they are rapidly 
increasing. The established carriers are showing strong growth 
and have succeeded not only in taking business away from the 
passenger carriers but also in generating new demand (U.S.
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Industrial Outlook, 1991). The traditional airport-to-airport 
service offered by passenger carriers is giving way to the much 
more attractive door-to-door service offered by the all-cargo 
and air express carriers. In order to be more competitive in this 
market, passenger carriers have begun to engage in new pricing 
and advertising strategies in order to compete with the success­
ful all-cargo carriers. While costs to shippers are lower from the 
all-cargo carriers, many prefer to pay more for the reliable door- 
to-door service air express firms provide.
Advances in freight handling and documentation proce­
dures are also aiding the traditional air cargo carriers. Included 
in this market segment is the expedited small package carriers. 
However, the lines between the air cargo industry and the 
expedited small package industry are increasingly blurred as the 
package weight limits of the former letter and small package 
lines have been increased or even eliminated (Helms, 1989). 
For example, Federal Express has continued to raise their 
maximum weight limits for packages to compete with UPS. 
Now they have eliminated the weight limit entirely.
The air express sector owes much of its innovations to the 
Federal Express Corporation who made nationwide overnight 
deliveries possible through their utilization of a central super 
hub and smaller regional hubs. United Parcel Service (UPS) 
once only a surface delivery firm has also expanded and 
brought about competition in the air express market. Being the 
largest shipper of packages, UPS has beefed up its second-day 
air service, which was started in the mid 1970's, and in 1983 
entered the next-day air market to compete directly with 
Federal Express. UPS has begun the expansion toward a multi­
modal transportation company and is currently very successful 
as a bi-modal organization.
Both cargo and passenger carriers have expressed a strong 
interest and have even succeeded in expanding their services 
abroad. By the end of the 1990's, it is likely that four or five 
major carriers will have global networks, or transportation
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conglomerates merged with computer trackingcapabilities with 
an international market and focus. The removal of Europe's 
restrictions on trade in 1992 as well as German unification, 
other changes in Eastern Europe, and bi-lateral free trade 
agreements with Canada and Mexico will all offer potential for 
further international growth. Carriers, including Federal Ex­
press, UPS, and Emery have already established European 
hubs, and in the near future, hubs in the Asian and Pacific Rim 
market will be needed to serve this fast growing transportation 
customer segment.
Trucking
According to Industry Surveys (1989), the $1 20-billion-a- 
year regulated interstate trucking industry is divided into private 
and for-hire freight haulers. The for-hire group is the fastest 
growing segment and consists of common and contract carriers. 
Today, almost 90 percent of the profits generated are in the 
truckload (TL) division which consists of full or entire truckloads 
of freights and which carries cargo of 10,000 pounds or more.
Since the 1980 deregulation of the motor carrier industry, 
the number of ICC regulated truckers has more than doubled 
from 1 8,000 to 45,000 carriers (Industry Surveys, 1990). This 
growth has contributed to the beginning of new, primarily 
nonunion truckload carriers. There is relative ease of entry in 
this segment in all 48 contiguous states because of the minimal 
amount of capital required to start and the easily obtainable 
operating authority. Small, nonunion TL entrants also have a 
lower cost structure and can therefore undercut the rates 
charged by larger carriers. To cover the rising costs of staying in 
business, TL lines are differentiating themselves by offering a 
growing variety of value-added customer services.
The TL market is highly fragmented and due to intense 
competition, the small carriers operate on small profit margins. 
Very few major truck lines have emerged. If viewed as a single 
entity, for example, Landstar System, which operates Ranger
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Transportation and four smaller TL carriers, is the nation's 
largest truck line. J.B. Hunt takes credit for being the single 
largest TL carrier. Among others are Schneider National and 
North American Van Lines, which is a division of Norfolk 
Southern Railroad (Industry Surveys, 1990). It will be advanta­
geous for TL carriers to merge with other transportation carriers. 
Rail or air express firms, for example, that have already made 
the capital outlay for tracking technology and other customer 
services, would be good partners for the TL carriers. Also, 
shippers' practice of limiting their business to a small group of 
core carriers will contribute to further mergers in the trucking 
industry. To differentiate their service, carriers are beginning to 
offer shipment pick-ups with 24 hours, on-time delivery guar­
antees, and warehousing services. Over the next decade the 
number of carriers should be cut in half. "Analysts agree that to 
survive the anticipated shakeout (in the trucking industry), TL 
carriers must be well capitalized and able to finance the 
expensive investment in computers and satellite communica­
tion systems that will soon be necessary to com pete effectively" 
(Industry Surveys, 1989, p. R41).
Successful carriers must have satellite communication or 
electronic data interchange (EDI) capabilities to offer on-line 
shipment tracking and tracing services for their JIT customers. 
Shippers must know where a shipment is at all phases of the 
delivery process in order to track materials and expedite or de- 
expedite shipments as the production line demands. For ship­
pers of time-sensitive freight (which includes anyone participat- 
ingin JIT), a satellite link or EDI linkcan providean early warning 
for potential delivery disruption. The presence of these services 
should capture market share at the expense of other firms which 
lack the package tracing capabilities.
Private carriers. Private carriers, yet another participant in 
the trucking industry, are carrying their own raw materials or 
finished goods. They account for 55 percent of all truck 
movements found among manufacturers, retailers, food com­
panies, and utilities (Industry Surveys, 1990). Usually these
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private fleets exist because firms demand more service than can 
be provided by independent freight carriers. In the future, as 
multimodal transportation services with advanced services 
capabilities emerge, the number of more expensive private 
freight carriers should decrease. This private service is limited 
because it only provides over-the-road delivery. Firms must still 
go outside the organization and purchase transportation ser­
vices for other delivery modes.
Multi-modal transportation carriers can also provide a 
competitive edge over private trucking carriers through faster 
delivery times. Still other advantages are greater flexibility in 
scheduling, low cost and more reliable deliveries. Both are 
essential for manufacturers practicingJIT inventory control. The 
multi-modal transportation firm can specialize in all facets of 
transportation while allowing a service or manufacturing orga­
nization to concentrate on their core business without having to 
become transportation specialists. Firms can virtually eliminate 
their entire transportation departments and rely solely on the 
services of the multi-modal provider.
Contract-Carriers. Another growing trucking segments is 
contract carriage. In a contract carriage arrangement, trucking 
companies provide customized transportation distribution plans 
including everything from dispatching, maintenance, and bill­
ing, to regulatory filing. Most of the freight moved in this 
segment is TL but a growing portion of the freight is in less-than- 
truckload shipments. This reflects the practice of minimizing 
inventories through a JIT system and demanding and shipping 
smaller quantities. Contract carriers should continue to grow 
until the end of the 1990's when transportation conglomerates 
begin to offer these same services as well as other transporta­
tion-related services.
Less-Than-Truckload (LTL). The LTL segment has experi­
enced an industry concentration or a contraction in the number 
of carriers in the past decade. Last year, the three largest 
companies, Yellow Freight, Consolidated Freightways, and
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Roadway Express generated revenues equal to 40 percent of the 
LTL market. There are two reasons for increased concentration. 
The first of which is a steady stream of bankruptcies since 
deregulation, and secondly, the lack of new market entrants to 
replace firms that have failed. Due to the ease of entry and exit 
in this market, many firms have lacked the expertise and 
experience to be successful and profitable. Merger activity in 
the trucking industry today centers primarily on the fragmented 
regional market. The strategy seems to be to buy up small firms 
and create conglomerates (Industry Surveys, 1990).
Regional divisions using LTL shipping were ignored until it 
was recognized that these markets were growing faster than the 
long-haul businesses. An increasing percentage of this growth is 
due to manufacturers JIT practices. Although no figures cur­
rently exist on the percentage of businesses due to JIT practices, 
it is evident that more freight is being shipped shorter distances 
as suppliers are relocating near their major customers. Also 
shipments are smaller and more frequent as supplies must be 
brought to the companies on tighter time schedules. Compa­
nies are moving to sole sourcing of supplies and the supplier 
companies are moving their operations to locate near the major 
manufacturer. In the future, multi-modal carriers will be better 
able to offer LTL shipments since they will have size and scale 
advantages and can combine these smaller shipments, offering 
lower rates.
Rail Shipments
Traffic in the railroad industry is rising with the recent 
increase in industrial and foreign trade since the late 1980's. 
Though there are still challenges ahead for this ever-growing 
transportation segment, sixteen Class I railroads (defined as 
those with revenues exceeding $91.5 million annually), are 
currently in operation, and of these only seven are major players 
(U.S. Industrial Outlook, 1991). Moving forward with innova­
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tions in equipment, computerized tracking of freight and 
scheduling of trains, and market programs, the industry is 
directly challenging other transportation modes.
The ideas of stacking cars on piggyback and intermodal 
traffic, such as those with trucking, are emerging to offer 
different alternatives to ship cargo. Even though these increases 
in rail traffic are taking place, the industry still has concerns 
about profitability due to the increased competition between 
railroads and domestic motor carriers. Mergers between these 
two transportation providers could reduce or eliminate these 
concerns due to synergy and lessened competition.
Since deregulation rail services are becoming more flexible 
and, due to competition, there are increased incentives to 
improve efficiency, compete more aggressively, and restructure 
rates and methods of operations. Safety records have also 
improved along with the financial situation and the physical 
conditions of the industry. All of this has been done without 
sharp rate increases, but the real test for this industry is earning 
adequate profits. Shippers are striving to reduce total transpor­
tation costs. Conglomerates can help shippers to meet this goal 
by reducing shipping distances, transit time, and inventory 
holdings (Industry Surveys, 1 991).
The regulatory environment of the railroads, as it relates to 
pricing, service, and financial structure, has been shaped by the 
Staggers Rail Act of 1980. Through this act, industry flexibility 
has increased so that carriers could compete more aggressively 
for traffic. Railroads have also become more sensitive to 
shippers' demands by adjusting their own operations and 
capital plans to reduce cost and redirect expenditures to 
maintenance and service. The restructuring of the railroad 
industry is still continuing. "Others agree that although the pace 
of mergers between major railroads has slowed, restructuring 
continues through the purchase or transfer of smaller portions
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of rail systems and acquisitions of, or coordination with, carriers 
in such other modes as trucking and barge transportation" (U.S. 
Industrial Outlook, 1989, p.52-12).
Since 1979, there have been several major rail consolida­
tions, and in 1984, the first major rail-barge merger occurred 
between CSX Corporation and American Commercial Lines, a 
subsidiary of American Commercial Barge Lines. In 1985, 
Norfolk Southern Railroad, which was the merger of Norfolk, 
Western, and Southern railroads, acquired North American 
Van Lines, Inc., a household goods and general freight trucking 
company. In 1987, Union Pacific Corporation's acquisition of 
Overnite Transportation Company (a trucking firm) was ap­
proved by the Interstate Commerce Commission (U.S. Indus­
trial Outlook, 1 991).
Union Pacific reported improvements in operating income 
net income, and earnings in rail operations due to an increase 
in carloadings. Major gains were in intermodal traffic. Union 
Pacific Corporation is continuing its emphasis on cost cutting 
and productivity improvements ("Income Stronger at Union 
Pacific, 1990").
Rail intermodal volume is growing. Intermodal transporta­
tion contributed 1 4 percent of Burlington Northern's revenues 
in 1989 and they arecontinuingto combine highway trailer and 
rail shipment movement. Another rail company, Kansas City 
Southern Lines, has invested in facilities and equipment to 
advance the efficient rail movement of shipments. Their con­
tainer/trailer system can transport products by rail, air, sea, or 
highway combinations. CSX rail, with Sea-Land Logistics, is 
designing and providing customized multimodal, integrated 
transportation packages as well.
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The primary source of rail traffic traditionally has been from 
bulk commodities. Barge carriers have been the major competi­
tors of railroads for these bulk shipments. However, as JIT 
experience and forecasting improves, rail transportation will 
become a more viable transportation alternative for other 
shipments too.
Water Shipments
The U.S. Water Transportation industry consists of Interna­
tional sea and domestic transportation (including passenger 
ship), Great Lakes - St. Lawrence Seaway Carriage, Inland 
Waterway Movements, and Local Waterborne Cargo Ship­
ments (U.S. Industrial Outlook, 1989). Deep Sea and domestic 
water transportation includes general cargo, dry bulk, and 
liquid bulk. General cargo operations include the movement of 
finished goods by regularly scheduled liner-type vessels operat­
ing as common carriers. Liquid cargos are handled by tankers 
and tank barge fleets and are transported as contract or 
proprietary shipments. While water carriage is not a primary 
mode of transportation for the beginning JIT shipper, customers 
that have moved along the JIT experience curve can begin touse 
less time-sensitive delivery services like water transportation. 
This long-term movement to slower and more reasonable 
transportation forms will benefit both shippers and final cus­
tomers as evidenced by reduced shipping costs and price 
savings.
The future of foreign water transportation also depends on 
continued growth of U.S. exports. International expansion and 
the expected growth of exports will mean profitable growth for 
deep sea operations. For example, Miller Transporters Inc. a 
bulk tank carrier with 30 U.S. terminals recently formed a 
partnership with Wim Vos, a tank container operator based in 
Holland. The joint venture gives customers of both firms the 
capacity to ship products in bulk tanks anywhere in the world. 
Ocean transportation is provided by the parent company of 
Wim Vos and the company has depots in the United Kingdom,
7 08 Journal of Transportation Management
the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, France, Germany, 
and Italy. Their JIT customers include food manufacturers and 
soap companies as well as chemical manufacturers. Miller felt 
their customers would be shipping more products overseas so 
they established the relation with this European Firm (White, 
1990). Another intermodal container firm, American President 
Companies Ltd., provides distribution and transportation ser­
vices within and between Asia and North America through an 
organizational structure that combines ocean, rail, and truck 
transportation (“American President...", 1990).
It is assumed that as companies continue to expand 
internationally and export products abroad, domestic water 
shipping operations will become a more important source of 
freight movement. In addition, as JIT penetration increases, JIT 
planning and forecasting improves, and as organizations locate 
on inland waterways and port cities to take advantage of the 
reduced transportation costs, water shipping will increase. As 
delivery time needs become subordinated, the primary factor 
influencing the JIT customer's choice of transportation carrier 
will be price.
Conduct Within Transportation Industry
The economic markets in today's environment are blurring 
and a worldwide global economy is emerging. Many businesses 
are in the process of changing to an international industry 
structure. At the same time, many of these companies are 
movingto a JIT inventory system to eliminate inventory holding 
costs and streamline their production and service operations. 
While no exact figures exist on the number of firms using JIT 
inventory control procedures the growth of the current litera­
ture on JIT and its related partner of total quality management 
(TQM) suggest its pervasive popularity. JIT is changing the mode 
of transportation service that the industries have traditionally 
used as well as their internal transportation practices.
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In terms of logistics, no longer do traffic managers want to 
deal with ten or twelve different transportation firms to send a 
variety of shipments domestically and internationally; they are 
demanding to deal with fewer and fewer transportation parties 
(just like they do with their own JIT suppliers) with the ultimate 
goal of working with only one, fully-integrated, multi-modal 
transportation provider. The shipping customer's demand for 
one-stop-shipping is rapidly changing the transportation indus­
try by having all shipments move from one door (manufacturer) 
to another door (destination) by one party, perhaps over a 
variety of transportation modes. To accommodate the changing 
market, many transportation companies are growing and adapt­
ing to meet these needs.
Some transportation providers are moving toward the 
multi-modal industry structure already. For example, United 
Parcel Service (UPS) began with an extensive ground fleet, and 
augmented ground delivery by expanding their air fleet to meet 
the company's needs. They currently service every address in 
the United States and Puerto Rico and more than 100 foreign 
countries in which they operate in the door-to-door freight 
market.
Federal Express increased their market penetration with the 
purchase of Flying Tiger Lines, an international air carrier with 
bulk shipment capabilities. This purchase provided Federal 
Express with a larger market share while simultaneously giving 
them additional international routes. In the trucking arena, 
Consolidate Freightways Inc. purchased Emery Air Freight 
Corporation to expand their services to air delivery and to 
provide customers additional transportation choices. In another 
example, Santa Fe Railway and J.B. Hunt Transport Services 
recently established intermodal freight transportation with Santa 
Fe providing the line-haul service and J.B. Hunt coordinating 
shipment pickup and delivery (Bowersox, 1990). While these 
mergers have not yet resulted in profits, these strategic alliances 
have growth potential to be profitable in the future.
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As can be seen by these mergers, the transportation 
industry is beginning the consolidation needed to form the 
transportation conglomerates. Another way JIT is changing the 
transportation industry is in the frequency and size of ship­
ments. With continuing adaptations, transportation carriers can 
become one-stop-shipping companies for both small and large 
shipment quantities. In a recent study by Lieband Miller (1988), 
the biggest transportation beneficiary of JIT was the contract 
truck carrier because their schedules were tailored to the 
customers' needs. Air transportation also increased consider­
ably in both inbound and outbound operations due to the 
implementation of the JIT system. The experiences of large 
corporations including Northern Telecom Canada Ltd., Chrysler 
Corp. and Kodak Inc. show that judicious use of air freight can 
lead to significant distribution benefits even through air trans­
port is a premium service, the demand for emergency service 
often occurs with little advance notice. The pressures of JIT 
manufacturing are intense and in some cases parts must be 
flown to the assembly line to keep the line running. Airfreight 
has always been the preferred mode for handlingJIT emergen­
cies. It also can offer enhanced customer service (Tausz, 1989), 
and it is this value-added service of time utility that is the basis 
for the profit of the airfreight segment of the transportation 
industry.
These air and trucking modes are utilized more heavily in 
the introduction stage of JIT, but it would naturally follow that 
as firms move along the JIT learning and experience curve they 
should move to slower and more inexpensive modes of trans­
portation as their ability to forecast demand and schedule 
production flows improve (See Figure 1). Emergencies should 
be less frequent and coordination should improve thus elimi­
nating the need for relying solely on the more expensive and 
more time-critical shipment modes.
When JIT customers were asked about carrier selection and 
what factors were important to them, their responses included 
on-time performance along with responsiveness to short-term
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needs. Both of these characteristics are very important to the JIT 
system. Other important factors were tracking capability, which 
will become more important as schedules become tighter and 
tighter (Lieb and Miller, 1988.)
Another change occurring in the transportation industry is 
in customer service. Many carriers are no longer playing pricing 
games to get a short-term contract but just like JIT principles, 
they are establishing long-term relationships with their domestic 
and international customers. An example of this can be seen in 
the relationship between GM and Robin Transport. Robin holds 
a three-year contract that covers 1 5 loads each day. Robin did 
not receive the GM contract on price alone, but sold them on 
all aspects of their delivery system including equipment, on- 
time delivery, and flexibility. The long-term contract helps the 
transportation firm and their customers to better plan for the 
future and allows the transportation company the time and 
scheduling flexibility (due to the security of the long-term 
relationship and level of communication) to provide better 
service. Another company benefiting from longterm relation­
ships is Roadway Express. With long-term, secure contracts 
Roadway has purchased almost two thousand new trailers and 
has begun calling itself "America's just-in-time-carrier" ("Trans­
portation Changes..." 1984). Roadway adopted this marketing 
strategy for differentiation as well as for targeting the needs of 
the growing number of JIT customers.
The transportation industry is combining various modes to 
better serve their international customers as well. One example 
is the assembly of the Cadillac Allan te, an expensive ($50,000 + ) 
two-seat sports car designed by Cadillac to compete directly 
with BMW and Mercedes Benz. The chassis is built in Detroit 
and flown to Italy in specially designed Boeing 747F jet 
freighters. In Italy, the bodies are assembled with the chassis for 
a perfect fit, and then they are flown back to Detroit for final 
assembly. The merger of global assembly and air freight sounds
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somewhat less than practical for automobile production, but, 
when the reduction in transportation time, theft, and damage 
are taken into account, this operation becomes feasible. It also 
saves time and money, and the cars can be tailored by experts 
in each stage of the JIT operation (Kaufman, 1989). Operations 
such as this are becoming more commonplace in today's 
transportation industry as it adapts to the new JIT-induced 
trends.
According to Bowersox (1990), these examples illustrate 
logistics alliances. These alliances are becoming more prevalent 
as manufacturers and transportation firms combine to lower 
distribution and storage costs and at the same time improve the 
quality of service.
Electronic-Da ta-ln terchange(EDI)
The transportation industry is also changing by adopting 
advanced computerized electronic data interchange. EDI al­
lows transportation shippers to perform a myriad of services 
including electronic billing, calculation of rate charges, sched­
uling pickup and delivery, tracing shipments, and creating 
customized databases using a customer's traffic history. The 
catalysts for EDI growth are high interest rates, (which speed the 
adoption of the JIT inventory system) and the sharp drop in 
computer costs (which puts personal computers on almost 
every business desk). Shippers practicing JIT inventory control 
techniques demand EDI for timely and accurate information 
about the status of their shipments. The benefits for shippers 
and carriers who use EDI are: (1) reduced clerical costs, (2) less 
paper handling, (3) faster transaction processing time, and (4) 
fewer mistakes (Industry Surveys, 1991).
American Airlines (AMR Corporation) is testing their own 
fully automated, bar-coded tracking system for their air cargo. 
The system will enable American to track each air cargo
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shipment as well as to simplify operations. Through their AMR 
Information Services American Airlines has created a comput­
erized reservation system for Europe's railroads, working with 
the French National Railway System to coordinate and sched­
ule international shipments.
United Parcel Service (UPS) has implemented internal 
computer systems integrated into their shipping business. They 
have replaced the microcomputer with local area networks to 
reduce clerical time and to help UPS keep track of packages 
more economically (Eskow, 1989).
At Federal Express, EDI is used in all aspects of the business. 
When a courier picks up a package it is scanned and automati­
cally put into the beginningof the system. As the package travels 
from point to point, it is scanned to allow continuous tracking. 
If any information is needed about the package, it can be 
retrieved and analyzed. This helps Federal Express experts to 
see if they have any steps in their operations that could be 
corrected to better serve the customer. In addition, their EDI 
can be accessed by their customers at any time.
Roadway Package System (RPS) offers customers scanning 
technologies. With their automated hubs, they offer the cus­
tomers less package handling, more efficient distribution, and 
the elimination of sorting errors. Technology has also allowed 
RPS to offer a wide range of services with package tracing and 
itemized billing, specialized pricing programs, voice encoding, 
and image processing.
Roadway Express trucking company has a personal-com­
puter software system to allow customers to create and print 
bills of loading and express documents directly to a Roadway 
terminal. With their system they can also receive shipment 
status information, manifests, claims, and communicate via 
computer with the customer.
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Consolidated Rail Corporation has merged all their cus­
tomer service functions into a single corporate unit. This has 
added simplified pricing and billing systems and has added the 
capability for the electronic filing of rates. Customers can access 
this information from their remote computer terminals.
As more participants in the transportation industry continue 
to use EDI and computer tracking, additional customer services 
can be offered. Another service that will become available is 
inventory and transportation consultation.
Consulting Services
With the use of portable personal computers, a transporta­
tion sales specialist in carrier sales can quickly show a customer 
a variety of transportation shipment scenarios and the current 
rates for each alternative transportation mode. When the 
customer places an order, it can be sent by telephone and 
automatically entered. All of the shipment instructions will 
automatically be sent to the proper locations and a hard copy 
can be printed for the customer immediately. The salesperson 
can also track existing shipments if customers have questions 
about a current shipment location. This consulting service is 
even more advantageous to the shipper if the transportation 
company has multiple modes under one umbrella. They can 
simulate numerous combinations of rail, water, truck and air 
delivery to determine the optimal balance that best meets the 
customer's specific needs.
Transportation conglomerates have added these consulting 
services to expand their range of customer service offerings. 
Burlington Northern Inc. railroad view transportation services as 
an extension of their customer's businesses and have developed 
a software package that enables customers to evaluate all 
relevant logistical factors and costs when selecting among the 
various transportation options.
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Federal Express established a corporate division to address 
the custom logistics needs of customers, giving Federal Express 
the opportunity to assume primary responsibility for the 
customer's inventory management needs. As more firms in the 
transportation industry move toward the conglomerate organi­
zation structure, the consulting services will be a vital depart­
ment. JIT customers are requesting help coordinating and 
scheduling all their transportation needs. Proactive transporta­
tion providers will address these consulting needs.
Warehousing
Another trend in the transportation industry is the use of 
third party distribution. This service is rapidly gaining accep­
tance, especially in the manufacturing environment as custom­
ers demand dedicated and consolidated distribution opera­
tions. One firm implementing this distribution system is Federal 
Express. Their “Parts Bank" combines a storage facility with an 
expedited-delivery system that can dispatch medical equip­
ment, electronic components, and other critical parts to users 
around the country on the next available plane (Quinn, 1985). 
All storage, warehousing, and insurance concerns are handled 
by Federal Express.
To capture business that combined rail, warehousing and 
truck delivery, CSX railroad has begun a network of bulk 
intermodal distribution centers and has formed Total Distribu­
tion Services Inc. Shipments are transferred by rail to the 
distribution centers and are stored and scheduled for local or 
just in time delivery by truck.
Many manufacturers are using similar warehousing services 
instead of setting up and maintaining their own multiple 
regional warehouses. The warehousing services keep their 
customers' equipment and products in working order because 
the immediate shipment of a part can minimize machine and
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production downtime and save everyone both time and money. 
Warehouse services are growing as U.S. companies reevaluate 
how they maintain inventories and move their materials. To 
meet JIT inventory needs, more companies will eliminate their 
own warehouses and purchase warehouse inventory systems as 
well as their transportation services from outside in order to 
better maintain their production schedules. Firms who are 
considering exporting their goods or who want to rapidly enter 
the global market will also consider using warehousing services.
Leaseway, a $1.4 billion transportation company has "as­
sembled a group of services targeted at manufacturers ranging 
from public warehousing, sub-assembly of finished goods and 
consolidation of shipments of warehouse management systems 
and, of course, distribution of goods. Since its conception, 
Leaseway has established 30 distribution and consolidation 
centers throughout the country and serves more than 1 50 
clients, many major manufacturers" (Davisson, 1986, p. 69). 
These examples have been possible due to the deregulation of 
the trucking and airline industries and lessening of anti-trust 
lawsuits, and both have capitalized on the JIT environment. 
Other transportation firms should add warehousing services as 
they make the commitment to developing and providing totally 
integrated distribution systems.
JIT and the Transportation Industry
The primary reason transportation companies must merge 
to combine the various forms of service is due to the JIT 
experience continuum. As shown in Figure 1, firms implement­
ing JIT procedures are less experienced with the production 
and inventory control concepts. Therefore, they experience 
more problems that demand expedited shipment. Planning, 
forecasting, and demand levels are not as accurate, causing 
firms to primarily use air express services and time-sensitive 
truck delivery. There is very limited rail and barge use at this 
initial level of JIT experience. Truck delivery replaces air
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shipments as firms better plan lead times and schedule produc­
tion runs. In the mature stages of JIT, fewer and fewer produc­
tion changes occur and there are minimal scheduling problems. 
Lead times expand from several days to several weeks or more. 
Usually at these JIT stages, companies have added international 
operations and can rely on the less expensive forms of rail and 
barge transportation. Throughout the various levels however, 
on-line tracking services as well as consulting services remain 
important.
Transportation firms, like the customers they serve, must 
become just-in-time shippers in order to remain competitive. 
The improvements brought about by JIT will benefit all firms 
adopting the improvement principles. As customer needs change, 
the transportation companies must have all transportation 
modes and services at their disposal. As shippers demand full- 
service transportation providers, the providers must have these 
services available. Thus JIT is the stimulus behind the changing 
future of the transportation industry.
Industry Performance
The goal of all the emerging multi-modal carriers is to 
provide shippers with high-quality, flexible transportation ser­
vices over one mode or over several transportation modes. By 
combining transportation forms synergy in profitability, perfor­
mance, and service is possible.
One company on the leading edge of multi-modal trans­
portation is CSX Corporation. Based in Richmond, Va., CSX is 
an international, multimodal transportation company with 
interests in rail, ocean container shipping, intermodal, trucking, 
warehousing and distribution. They have the largest railroad in 
the United States (as measured by operating revenue and track- 
miles), a container-shipping company, and an inland barge line. 
In the 1990's CSX's business plans call for continued emphasis 
on improving profitability by controlling costs, particular in rail
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and ocean shipping, while expanding services in key growth 
markets for rail, container shipping, barging intermodal and 
other transportation related activities. Since 1985, their rev­
enues have grown from $5.3 billion to over $7.7 billion, and 
CSX executives see room for continued expansion. The only 
area that CSX has not yet ventured into is the air express segment 
of the transportation industry (CSX Annual Report, 1989). 
Similar performance levels are possible for other multi-modal 
transportation providers.
Multi-Modal Transportation: The Tuture
Since the deregulation of the 1 980's, the largely artificial 
boundaries among transportation modes (LTL, TL, air freight, 
railroads, and barges) have been vanishing. Without the arbi­
trary restrictions imposed by regulatory systems, the market is 
becoming less specialized and as shown in Figure 2, additional 
transportation services are merging.
Many examples in the transportation industry signal this 
movement. For example, UPS ground package delivery has 
added air express services and tracking to the services they offer. 
Federal Express has moved from air transportation of small 
packages to the international air cargo market with their pur­
chase of Flying Tiger Lines and has added tracking consulting 
and warehousing services. CSX Corporation has rail, barge, and 
surface modes under one company. CF trucking has combined 
with Emery Air Freight and gained air and international markets. 
Two railroads now have merged with trucking firms to gain 
synergy in piggy-back services--Union Pacific Railroad is now 
combined with overnight trucking and Norfolk Southern Rail­
roads is part of North American Van Lines Trucking and the list 
of multi-modal examples continues to increase.
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In fact, largely as a result of just-in-time inventory, transpor­
tation customers are increasingly oriented toward a total, 
integrated logistics operation (including inventory manage­
ment, handling, and warehousing) rather than simply purchas­
ing transportation services alone. Regulatory rigidities once 
obstructed the provision of reliable, fine-tuned, custom-tai­
lored transport service. Today these multi-modal, enhanced 
combinations are both feasible and necessary. In the recent 
future the transportation industry should see these changes 
rapidly increase due to the increasing customer emphasison JIT. 
Successful transportation companies will be the ones that have 
the ability to meet their customer's one-stop JIT shippingneeds.
Volume IV, Number I 121
Figure 2














































"The Past" "The Future"
122 Journal of Transportation Management
Bibliography
"American President Sees Slight Decrease." The Commer­
cial Appeal Memphis, TN, July 23, 1990, p. B5.
Bowersox, Donald J. "The Strategic Benefits of Logistics 
Alliances." Harvard Business Review, July-August 1990, pp. 36- 
45.
Bradley, Peter. "Global sourcing takes split-second tim­
ing." Purchasing, July 20, 1989, V. 107 #2, pp. 52-56.
CSX Corporation 1989 Annual Report And Form 10-K.
Davisson, John F. "Third-Party Distribution (The Growing 
Alternative)." Handling and Shipping Management, October 
1986, V. 27 #11, pp. 69-71.
Eskow, Dennis. "More LANs, Cheaper Keystrokes Help 
Run a Tighter Ship." PC Week, December 4, 1989, V. 6 # 48, 
p. 1 and 8.
Helms, Marilyn M. "A Structure Conduct Performance 
Analysis of the Expedited Small Package Industry." Transporta­
tion Quarterly, 43(1), (January 1989), 101 -1 22.
"Income Stronger at Union Pacific." The Commercial 
Appeal, Memphis, TN, July 23, 1990, p. B5.
Kaufman, Lawrence H. "Air Cargo, JIT the Perfect Match." 
Air Commerce, April 24, 1989, pp. 4T - 5T, & 8T.
Lieb, Robert C. and Miller, Robert A. "JIT and Corporate 
Transportation Requirements." Transportation Journal. Spring 
1988, V 27 # 3, pp. 5-10.
Volume IV, Number I 123
Moskal, Brian S. "Enough Premium Carriers In The '90's? 
Don't Bet On It." Industry Week, August 21, 1989, V. 238 # 
16, pp. 31-34.
Quinn, Francis J. "How airfreight fits into the just-in-time 
picture." Traffic Management, June 1985, V. 24, pp. 76-79, 81.
Shippers Choose Air To Meet Special Needs." Global 
Trade, 1989, v. 107, p. 45.
Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys, Standard & Poor's 
Corporation, May 18, 1989, October 1 9, 1989, December 7, 
1989, PP. A22-23, R 1 -51, October 25, 1990, May 23, 1991, 
June 20, 1991.
Tausz, Andrew. "The Airfreight Payoff." Distribution, Feb­
ruary 1989, pp. 36-42.
"Transportation Changes — Just In Time." Handling and 
Shipping Management, September 1984, V. 25, pp. 46-50.
UPS International Air Brochure, 1989, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, International Trade Administration, pp. 52-1 - 52- 
21.
U.S. Industrial Outlook, 1989, U.S. Department of Com­
merce, International Trade Administration, pp. 52-1 - 52-21.
White, Deborah. "Miller Transporters Inc. Forms Joint 
Venture With Dutch Firm." The Commercial Appeal - Mem­
phis, TN, July 23, 1990, p. B5.
124 Journal of Transportation Management
PERCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
MOTOR CARRIERS AND SHIPPERS 
REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF 
CARRIER SELECTION CRITERIA
by
Shane R. Premeaux, McNeese State University, LA 
Roger Dale Abshire, Houston State University and 
Charles H. Rader, McNeese State University, LA
Introduction
Expectations are that in the nineties even more attention 
will be paid to satisfying consumer preferences. In all likelihood, 
this trend will extend to the unregulated motor carrier industry. 
An effective marketing strategy results in consumer satisfaction 
for profit. Shipper satisfaction is a function of carriers providing 
a selection variable mix which best serves shippers. In the 
transportation industry much less has been done to determine 
the nature of understanding that carriers have regarding the 
most significant selection variables as perceived by shippers. 
According to the literature, few carriers appear to really know 
what factors actually influence the shipper's choice of carrier. In 
fact, previous studies have found that the carrier choice decision 
may be regarded by shippers and carriers in a much different 
manner. Specifically, some shippers and carriers appear to have 
very different notions of what it is that constitutes satisfactory 
service by carriers.
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In the 1973 Bardi study, representatives of a number of 
firms were surveyed to determine the relative importance of 21 
carrier selection determinants. This study revealed that there 
was general agreement on five of the most important determi­
nants, but there was disagreement regarding many of the 
remaining variables.1 Evans and Southard's 1974 study of 
manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and motor carriers in 
Oklahoma investigated how shipper and carrier perceived 28 
factors, thought to be important in the selection decision. 
Respondent evaluations were measured on a five-point scale. 
Perceptions were then compared by means of t-tests. Evans and 
Southard found that there were six perceptual differences 
between shippers and carriers. 2
In 1 978, Jerman, Anderson and Constantin presented the 
results of their survey of individuals at the operations level in 
both shipper and carrier organizations. Each was asked to assess 
the importance of 26 variables believed to be important in the 
carrier selection decision making process. Differences in the 
perceptions of both groups were identified for 1 2 selection 
variables.3 The authors also explored the perceptions of a group 
of traffic managers, sales managers, and sales representatives 
with regard to 1 5 carrier selection variables. Perceptions were 
measured with a five-point scale. Mean differences were 
isolated by way of multivariate and univariate ANOVA. Signifi­
cant differences between shippers and carriers were found for 
seven of the fifteen variables.4
Of the above cited empirical research, only the Evans and 
Southard study sampled both shippers and carriers and specifi­
cally investigated the variables related to the selection of motor 
carriers. This study seeks to expand on previous studies and 
provide the information necessary for carriers to better under­
stand the importance of various selection criteria to shippers. 
Specifically, this research attempts to determine the factors that 
influence carrier selection, and how both carriers and shippers 
differ in relation to the importance they place on these vari­
ables. A systematic sample of traffic managers and motor carrier
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sale managers provided the data base for this study. The sample 
of traffic managers was composed of individuals employed by 
various manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing organizations 
and was drawn from The Official Directory of Industrial and 
Commercial Traffic Executives. This directory contains the 
names and addresses of 24,000 traffic managers. The motor 
carrier sales manager sample was drawn from motor freight 
trucking companies. The sampling frame used for the selection 
of the sales managers sample was a list of 18,446 motor carriers 
supplied by American Business List Inc.
A mail questionnaire was chosen because of the time 
necessary to complete the questionnaire and the geographic 
dispersion of the respondents. Questionnaires were mailed to 
500 shipper traffic managers and 500 carrier sales managers. Of 
those queried, 119 shippers and 103 carriers responded. The 
number of usable questionnaires was 102 and 94, respectively. 
The usable responses com prised 20.4 percentand 18.8 percent 
of the survey population, which should provide a reasonably 
accurate representation of the actual population.
Only nationwide motor carriers were surveyed. These 
carriers estimated that the majority of their shipments were 
truckload. The averages for the sample were 68 percent TL 
shipments and 32 percent LTL shipments. However, it should 
be noted that these percentages are averages of the total sample 
of respondents' estimations. The sample population may well 
haul special commodities, but this information was not specifi­
cally addressed in the survey.
Of the shippers responding 31 percent were food produc­
ers, 23 percent were producers of home products, 21 percent 
produced industrial goods destine for further processing, 7 
percent produced electronics products, 3 percent of the re­
spondents produced chemicals, and 15 percent classified 
themselves as "other” types of producers. Seventy-three per­
cent of the shipper sample stated that they normally ship in large 
lot sizes.
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Previous studies used a varying number of carrier selection 
criteria. Therefore, it was logical to draw from previous work in 
selectingthe criteria to be included in the survey. Once variable 
repetition was eliminated 35 possible selection criteria, which 
were thought to be used by shippers in their motor carrier 
selection decisions, were isolated (see Table 1).
Both carriers and shippers were queried regarding 35 
variables commonly thought to be important in the carrier 
selection decision. A scale was used to indicate the importance 
of each of these factors to both shippers and carriers. Shippers 
were asked to rate these factors in their own motor carrier 
selection decision. Carriers were also asked to rate the factors 
indicating the carrier's perception of the importance of these 





5. One of the most important factors
Perceptual Differences Between Shippers and 
Carriers Regarding Motor Carrier Selection Decisions
Initially, descriptive statistics in the form of frequency and 
crosstabulation tables were computed. These calculations were 
performed to get a "feel" for the data. Then, a comparison was 
made to determine if a difference existed between the percep­
tions of shippers and carriers regarding 35 motor carrier selec­
tion criteria. Analysis of variance was used to compare the 
perceived importance assigned to each selection criteria by 
both shippers and carriers. A mean rating score was calculated 
for each of the factors for both carriers and shippers. These 
responses were compared, and an "F" statistic computed. In all
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cases a significance level of .05 was used. The variables with a 
statistically significant difference between the perception of 
shippers and carriers are identified by asterisks. In order to 
evaluate the level of satisfaction provided shippers by carriers an 
analysis of the importance of various selection criteria to 
shippers was conducted. The statistically significant mean rat­
ings and rankings for both shippers and carriers were analyzed 
and the overall results presented in Table 1.
A comparison of both shipper and carrier rankings revealed 
that only six carrier selection variables were ranked exactly the 
same by both groups. A review of the information in Table 1 
further revealed that there was general agreement on the 
relative importance of sixteen of the thirty-five selection vari­
ables. However, statistically significant differences resulted 
between shipper and carrier mean ratings for nineteen of the 
thirty-five selection criteria. Only four of the nineteen statisti­
cally significant selection variables were rated higher by ship­
pers. The other fifteen statistically significant selection factors 
were rated higher by carriers.
Carriers ranked only two of the shippers ten most important 
selection variables similarly. Only three of these ten variables 
were statistically significant. Two of these factors were rated 
higher by shippers than by carriers. The fact that carriers were 
not as concerned as shippers with emergency response and 
providing leadership in offering more flexible rates, could well 
result in shipper dissatisfaction. Not only was the emergency 
response issue statistically significant, but it was ranked third by 
shippers and eighteenth by carriers. The ranking discrepancy of 
the rate flexibility issue was even greater, with a shipper ranking 
of seven and a carrier ranking of twenty-five. The likelihood of 
shippers being dissatisfied is heightened because these criteria 
are among the ten most important variables as ranked by 
shippers.
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Table 1
Summary of Findings: Perceptions of Shippers & Carriers 














Reliability of on time 
delivery. 4.41 4.50 1 1
Reliability of on time 
pick-up. 4.32 4.44 2 2
Total transit time for the 
shipment. 4.21 4.15 3 10
Carrier response in 
emergency situations. 4.21* 3.74 3 18
Financial stability of 
carrier. 4.14 4.07 5 11
Handling expedited 
shipments. 4.12 4.18 6 9
Carrier's leadership in 
offering more flexible rates. 4.11* 3.33 7 25
Carrier reputation for 
dependability. 3.94 4.44* 8 2
Geographic coverage of 
carrier. 3.87 4.05 9 12
*
variables were found to be statistically significant at the .05 level.















Discount programs offered 
by carriers. 3.81 3.79 10 17
Carrier cooperation with 
shipper's personnel. 3.79 4.37* 11 4
Condition of equipment 
(cleanliness). 3.79 4.05* 11 12
Past performance of the 
carrier. 3.75 4.20* 13 8
Ease of claim settlement, 
(loss or damage) 3.75 4.02* 13 14
Freight loss experience 
withthe carrier. 3.73 3.82 15 16
Carrier representative's 
knowledge of shippers 
needs. 3.69 4.37* 16 4
Scheduling flexibility. 3.68 3.69 17 19
Freight damage experience 
with the carrier. 3.64 4.30* 18 7
Carrier assistance in 
obtaining rate or 
classification changes. 3.54 3.65 19 21
‘variables were found to be statistically significant at the .05 level.















Carrier attitude toward 
acceptance of small 
shipments. 3.53* 2.76 20 31
Carrier honors shipper's 
routing requests. 3.45 3.17 21 26
Computerized hilling 
and tracing services. 3.44 3.17 22 26
Personal relations with 
the carrier. 3.44 3.95* 22 15
Overcharge claims service. 3.35 3.37 24 24
Courtesy of vehicle 
operators. 3.33 4.35* 25 6
Feedback from the 
consignee to the shipper 
about the quality of 
service given by specific 
carriers. 3.24 3.69* 26 19
Information provided to 
shippers by the carrier. 3.07 3.62* 27 22
Carrier transportation 
equipment designed to 
facilitate easy and 
fast loading and unloading. 3.02* 2.61 28 33
*variables were found to be statistically significant at the .05 level.















Carriers ability to handle 
special products. 2.99 3.07 29 29
Diversion and
reconsignment
privileges. 2.79 2.81 30 30
Regular calls by carrier 




other firms. 2.46 3.16* 32 28
Carrier willingness to 
participate in freight 
consolidation practices. 2.39 2.44 33 35
Fabrication in transit 
privileges. 2.10 2.51* 34 34
Gifts/gratuities offered 
by carriers. 1.46 2.62* 35 32
*variables were found to be statistically significant at the .05 level.
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The next statistically significant variable ranked higher by 
shippers than carriers, dealt with the carrier's attitude toward 
small shipments. Shippers ranked this variable twentieth, while 
carriers ranked the variable thirty-first- Such ranking discrepan­
cies combined with statistically significant rating differences 
could result in additional shipper dissatisfaction.
Although providing transportation equipment designed to 
facilitate easy and fast loading and unloading was also statisti­
cally significant, and ranked higher by shippers than carriers, the 
actual ranking was twenty-eighth by shippers and thirty-third by 
carriers. Even though there is a statistically significant difference, 
this criteria is ranked so low that it is probably less of a priority 
for shippers than are the other three selection factors.
As was previously mentioned, carriers rated fifteen statisti­
cally significant selection factors higher than did shippers. 
Surprisingly, carriers ranked their representative's knowledge of 
shipper needs as the fourth most important carrier selection 
variable. However, there was a statistically significant difference 
between the ratings of shippers and carriers with regard to this 
variable. Carriers rated this selection factor higher than did 
shippers, but apparently are not striving hard enough to really 
understand actual shipper needs.
The majority of the remaining selection criteria, where 
statistically significant differences appeared and where carrier 
mean ratings were higher than shipper ratings, are tied to past 
performance and having established relationships with custom­
ers. Carriers rated reputation for dependability, carrier coop­
eration, past carrier performance, ease of claim settlement, 
freight damage experience, personal relations, courtesy of 
vehicle operators, feedback concerning quality service, infor­
mation provided to shippers, regular calls by carrier sales 
representatives, and opinions and recommendations of em­
ployees of other firms, higher than did shippers. Carriers also
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ranked all but one of these selection variables higher than did 
shippers. Carriers appear to be primarily concerned with em­
phasizing previous performance factors and with nurturing past 
relationships which led to successful carrier operations.
Only three of the statistically significant variables which 
were rated higher by carriers than shippers, were not directly 
related to past performance or customer relations. Condition of 
equipment, fabrication in transit privileges, and gifts and gratu­
ities offered by carriers are costly, and probably do not signifi­
cantly enhance shipper satisfaction, as would increased empha­
sis on other more highly rated factors. Even though the rankings 
for shippers and carriers of the condition of equipment were 
eleventh and twelfth, the statistically significant difference 
indicates that carriers are overemphasizing this factor. Possibly 
carriers are increasing their operating costs unnecessarily, thus 
limiting their ability to respond to the more significant needs of 
shippers. Fabrication in transit privileges and gifts and gratuities 
were ranked quite low by both groups which may present an 
opportunity for carriers to de-emphasize these criteria some­
what
Summary of Differences, Causes, 
and Methods of Overcoming Differences
As was previously mentioned, an effective marketing strat­
egy results in consumer satisfaction for profit. Shipper satisfac­
tion is a function of carriers providing a selection variable mix 
which best serves shippers. In order to evaluate the level of 
satisfaction provided shippers by carriers an analysis of the 
importance of various carrier selection criteria is essential. Areas 
where statistically significant differences were evident should 
be of major concern to carriers. Recognizing the existence of 
these differences, and possible causes of each difference affords 
the carrier an opportunity to develop more effective strategies 
to better serve shippers. A comparison of both shipper and
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carrier rankings revealed that only six selection variables were 
ranked exactly the same by both groups. Statistically significant 
differences resulted between shipper and carrier mean ratings 
for nineteen of the thirty-five selection criteria.
Only four of the nineteen statistically significant selection 
variables were rated higher by shippers. Shippers rated carrier 
response in emergency situations, carrier's leadership in offer­
ing more flexible rates, carrier attitude toward acceptance of 
small shipments, and providing transportation equipment de­
signed to facilitate easy and fast loading and unloading, higher 
than did carriers. It is interesting to note that of the four variables 
which were ranked higher by shippers, and were also statisti­
cally significant, one was related to rates, and three were related 
to specialized services. These differences could be caused by 
carriers clinging to the trappings of the regulated motor carrier 
environment, where rates and services were contingent on 
many factors, none of which involved consumer satisfaction as 
a carrier priority. Obviously, these differences could have a 
significantly negative impact on shipper profitability. Since 
carrier selection decisions are often made to maximize gains an 
inappropriate mix could result in lost business for carriers who 
misinterpret the importance of these selection factors. These 
differences and the resulting shipper dissatisfaction could be 
overcome by offeringa selection variable mix which offers these 
services, and provides for rate flexibility based on the specific 
needs of individual shippers.
Carriers rated fifteen statistically significant selection factors 
higher than did shippers. Carriers rated reputation for depend­
ability, carrier cooperation, past carrier performance, ease of 
claim settlement, freight damage experience, personal rela­
tions, courtesy of vehicle operators, feedback concerning qual­
ity service, information provided to shippers, regular calls by 
sales representatives, and opinions and recommendations of 
employees of other firms, higher than did shippers. These 
differences may be caused by carriers resting on their laurels, 
and placing too much emphasis on past relationships, rather
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than being responsive to current shipper needs. In a deregu­
lated environment this strategy may well invite disaster. Equip­
ment condition, fabrication privileges, and gifts were rated 
higher by carriers than shippers, but were not directly related to 
past performance or nurturing relationships. Overemphasizing 
any or all of these selection factors is costly and probably does 
not significantly enhance shipper satisfaction. Quite possibly 
carriers overemphasize these factors because shippers are 
prone to select carriers based on their past performance record 
and established relationships with shippers. However, shippers 
may well change carriers if they are not responsive enough to 
their actual needs, especially those needs that are most impor­
tant. An opportunity exist for carriers to overcome these 
differences by de-emphasizing the above criteria somewhat, 
and using any recovered resources to reformulate their selec­
tion variable mix.
The basic method of overcoming these differences involves 
the development of a reformulated mix which focuses on 
offering shippers better response in emergency situations, 
acceptance of small shipments, and providing real leadership in 
offering more flexible rates. If additional resources were avail­
able the reformulated mix would incorporate carrier equip­
ment designed to facilitate easy and fast loading and unloading. 
Basically, the new mix should enhance the quality of service and 
profit picture of shippers in the carriers' target market.
Implications
Carriers, in the survey group, ranked their representative's 
knowledge of shipper needs as the fourth most important 
carrier selection variable, but apparently are not striving hard 
enough to really understand shipper needs. A lack of under­
standing could make it impossible to effectively serve shippers. 
Carriers should strive to appreciate the importance of various 
selection criteria to their target markets, and develop a market­
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ing strategy to properly address these needs. A superior carrier 
strategy emphasizes a mix of selection variables in line with the 
importance placed on them by shippers. Structuring a service 
system which places too much emphasis on the less significant 
variables, and deemphasises the more significant selection 
variables will lead to shipper dissatisfaction, and subsequent 
carriers losses.
For motor carriers aspiring to provide their customers with 
the highest possible level of satisfaction, an understanding of the 
most important criteria used by shippers in selecting and 
retain ing carrier services is essential. Since there were sign ificant 
differences between the perceptions of this group of carriers 
and shippers regarding the relative importance of the selection 
criteria, carriers may not be satisfying shippers to the greatest 
degree possible. To overcome these differences carriers should 
take the forefront by providing leadership and innovation in 
relation to their selection mix, rather than keying on what they 
did in the past. Carriers may well have been selected because 
of their past performances and relationships, but shippers may 
not continue to utilize their services if carriers are not more 
responsive to actual shipper needs. Specifically, carriers should 
identify and emphasize those elements of their selection mix 
that are perceived as most important by the decision makers in 
the shipping organization. Carriers who are able to establish 
which of the selection criteria are most important are better able 
to develop a selection variable mix which will more thoroughly 
satisfy shipper needs, and thereby attract new customers and 
maintain existing clients.
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BOOK REVIEWS
The Management of Business Logistics 
John J. Coyle, Edward J. Bardi, C. John Langley, Jr. 
(St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company) 
5th edition (1992). 580 pages. $50.50 
ISBN 0-314-93364-6
Improvements
My first browse through the 5th edition highlighted what users 
anticipate: new and current examples from actual companies, 
and tables and graphs that have been updated to the most 
recently available information (which, for transportation and 
logistics activities, can be a chore). The 80s decade is reflected 
in both content and terminology. The transportation chapters 
include the expected changes and even a page devoted to the 
Maislin decision. "Supply Chain Management" has become a 
separate chapter as has "Logistics Quality." The authors don't 
dwell too much on contemporary buzz-words, although Dr. 
Demming et al. are referred to as "gurus."
The second impression from Edition 5 is that the chapters and 
sections aren't where they used to be. Physically, the chapters 
are of more similar lengths, from 6 to 7 percent of the total text 
pages each and they have returned to a semester-fitting 15 
chapters. The authors have done far more than simply update 
their material; they have re-integrated it, recognizing that some 
of the last chapters on strategic planningand future perspectives 
in the previous edition did appear "tacked-on."
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Along with a set of study questions, most chapters include one 
or two briefcases. Seven comprehensive case studies follow the 
final chapter. Other welcome additions, making this edition 
more than just another textbook, are compilations of logistics 
publications and associations preceding the existing glossary. 
Students will find this material more useful as their careers 
progress.
The new organization fits together fairly smoothly. "Global 
Logistics," greatly strengthened and moved up to Chapter 4 
(from Chapter 1 2 in the fourth edition), following "Supply 
Chain Management" as Chapter 3, finishes a broad framework 
in Part I before the more detailed topics of inventory and 
transportation in Parts II and III. These two groups of chapters 
are keyed to the systems of information, inventory and trans­
portation, and management decisions, respectively. (The 
chapter on "Logistics Information Systems" has been moved to 
lead-off Part II, separating it by 8 chapters from "Organization 
of the Logistics Function," which followed it in the 1988 
edition. Using the philosophy that organizational form governs 
information flow, some instructors may still assign these chap­
ters as an integrated pair.) The chapters in Part IV may be 
viewed more as staff activities than line management. Chapter 
1 2, "Facility Location," has an improved title over the former 
"Nodal Locations" and retains the useful appendix summariz­
ing the classical theories.
Future Considerations
Having taught from the earlier editions, I recognized some old 
picayune details that still might be improved the next time 
around. Chapter 1 has always included a fixed vs. variable cost 
problem that might better fit a succeeding chapter that one 
providing a logistics "overview". (The problem serves more to 
scare off those students whose math skills would benefit from 
attention to this exercise—but let's get them immersed in the 
course first.)
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The authors say (page 49) that "logistics frequently is called the 
other half of marketing," (although in earlier editions this read 
"sometimes called . . .")• With the more developed focus of 
each field, this phrase should at least be stated in the past tense 
and probably footnoted or deleted.
The transportation chapter provides three more examples that 
might be cleaned up in future editions. First, the modal 
comparison chart (page 285) has never rated pipelines for 
transit time, reliability, accessibility and security; other texts do 
not find this a problem. Second, regardless of whether from an 
actual example or a transposing error, the class rate table (page 
333) would certainly be easier to explain during lectures if the 
class 50 rates actually were 50 percent of the class 100 rates, the 
class 45 were 45 percent, and so on. A third, more minor 
irritant, is the continued use of a diagram of intermodal services 
that refers to "birdyback," a term virtually unused outside this 
text, making it neither cute nor accurate.
The new art work is generally good, notably the larger graphs 
showing the tapered rate effects. This accuracy was not re­
applied to the older total cost graphs which remain less-than- 
accurate sketches (e.g., page 205). A map showing landbridge 
concepts (page 1 26) and a drawing of a forklift truck (page 392) 
both require further explanation of their labels in the text.
Summary
This 5th edition is more complete, up-to-date, and readable 
than its successful predecessors. Its chapters are more success­
fully arranged as a logical body of logistics knowledge. The 
physical appearance has also been tightened without resorting 
to the high cost of multiple colors as found in many texts 
designed for basic business courses. (This last clause begs the 
question of whether or not logistics is a basic business course: 
it should be. Enough said.) It will be a good adoption for
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established transportation and logistics programs with an inte­
grating course (possibly preceding a case-work course), as well 
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